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TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM OF DRUG CONTROL
By any measure the ongoing explosion in the abuse and
trafficking of illicit drugs must be viewed as alarming. The past
few years have seen a dramatic upsurge in the use of heroin and
other opiates, the re-emergence of cocaine as a popular drug, and
expansion of the use and availability of synthetic and psy-
chotropic substances, and, perhaps of greatest international con-
cern, the penetration of illicit narcotics into markets hitherto
relatively free from drug involvement. Western Europe, Canada,
and most recently the Soviet Union1 have reported the growth of
drug-consuming populations.
At the same time, there has been an awakened interest in the
problems of drug addiction. Recognition of the essentially in-
ternational nature of the problem is spreading, albeit slowly. With
this recognition have come the rudiments of an international ap-
proach to the solution. As drug abuse continues to encompass
increasingly large numbers over an expanding geographic area, a
growing number of national leaders conclude that it is in their
interest to cooperate in bilateral, regional, and multinational
agreements aimed at curbing such abuse.
I. THE DRUGS
A. Opium, Morphine, and Heroin
Throughout it all, heroin has remained the single greatest chal-
lenge, the "ultimate drug of addiction, the most magnetic factor in
the drug scene and the one with the most tragic ... results . "...-2
The profits from the sale of heroin are staggering. In 1972 an
1 Michigan Daily, May 25, 1974, at 8. col. 1.
2 INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD, REPORT, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/17 (1972). at 1 I
[hereinafter referred to as INCB REPORTI.
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estimated ten to twelve tons of heroin were consumed by the
560,000 addicts in the United States.3 With daily sales in excess
of $17,000,000, 4 the sale of heroin is one of the largest businesses
in the country. Fully half of the addicts in the United States live
in New York City, where heroin overdose is the most common
cause of death for males between the ages of fifteen and
thirty-five.5
1. Growth and Production.- Heroin is processed from opium
gum, the extract of the opium poppy (popaver somniferum). The
plant, which grows best in warm, dry climates, reaches a height of
three to four feet, and bears purple blossoms and egg-sized pods.
There may be anywhere from five to twenty pods on a plant.
Opium growing is a labor intensive process, and sowing and
harvesting are done by hand. Two weeks after the harvest, the
pods are lanced and a white, gummy substance drains. This is an
extremely delicate operation requiring experienced workers. The
pods must be lanced at precisely the right moment, and a delay of
even a few days can destroy the yield entirely. Weather is also
critical. Too much rain will wash the opium off the pods and too
much sun will melt it. The draining gum is scraped from the pods
and formed into cakes. 6 This is raw opium, which may be con-
sumed without further processing.
Alternatively, the opium may be refined into morphine base and
then into heroin. The first stage, that of converting the opium into
morphine base, is normally done near the harvesting area, and the
second, that of converting the morphine base into heroin, in
"heroin labs" at transit points along the smuggling network. 7
Neither process demands great technical skill and neither requires
high pressure or temperatures, or large quantities of raw mate-
rials.
3 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, HEROIN BEING SMUGGLED INTO
NEW YORK CITY SUCCESSFULLY (1972), at II [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER
GENERAL].
4 Id. at 1.
5 Hearings on the International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem Before the Subcomm.
on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 92d Cong., Ist Sess. at 92-93 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
6 Id. at Ill. See also McLaughlin & Quinn, Drug Control in Iran: A Legal and
Historical Analysis, 59 IowA L. REV. 469 (1974), at 473 [hereinafter cited as McLaughlin
& Quinn].
7 SPONG, HEROIN: CAN TIlE SUPPLY BE STOPPED?, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., (Comm. Reprint 1972), at 5 [hereinafter cited as
SPONG]. The reason that opium is processed into morphine base near the place of harvest
is probably ease of transit. Ten pounds of opium reduces to one pound of morphine base,
making concealment much less difficult. There is no further reduction in bulk in the
conversion of morphine base to heroin.
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[T]he operations . . . are simple ones of soaking, filtering,
heating, precipitating, drying, and crushing. The basic equip-
ment required is inexpensive and can be quite primitive:
enamel pots or copper vats, strainers and filters, pans and
trays, and a simple heat source."
Most heroin labs are operated by a single "heroin chemist," who
has learned his trade through apprenticeship under other heroin
chemists, together with an unskilled assistant. It has been esti-
mated that a heroin laboratory capable of processing 100 kilo-
grams of heroin per week may be established for as little as
$4,000.9
2. The Licit Markets.-There are two world markets in opium.
The licit market consumes roughly 1,500 tons of opium annually
and is slowly expanding. Price and quantity vary according to a
more or less consistent supply-demand curve between govern-
ment enterprises and large pharmaceutical firms. Governments
license farmers to grow specific quantities of opium, and buy the
yield at previously established prices. Although there is some
diversion of crdps at this level, security measures become in-
creasingly stringent as the opium passes from the farmer to the
governments and thence to the large pharmaceutical firms. These
firms, principally from the United States and Western Europe, are
extremely closely regulated, and there is believed to be little
"seepage" of processed opium into illicit channels. 10 By far the
greatest proportion of licit opium is used in the production of
morphine and codeine for legitimate medical purposes. India en-
joys a near monopoly position in the supply of opium for this
purpose."i
3. Illicit Markets.-a. Southeast Asia. The illicit market is far
more complex. Because of the nature of the market, accurate
statistics are difficult to obtain, but estimates of total annual
production range from 1,00012 to 1,80013 ons. Easily half of this
8 U.S. CABINET COMM. ON INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL, WORLD OPIUM'SURVEY
(1972), at 15 [hereinafter cited as WORLD OPIUM SURVEY].
I Id. at 15. See also McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 6, at 477.
10 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at 5. See also Spong, supra, note 7, at 2-3.
"' SPONG, supra note 7, at 3. The six largest producers of licit opium were India, with
943 tons; U.S.S.R., with 200 tons; Iran, with 156 tons; Turkey, with 150 tons; the
People's Republic of China, with an estimated 100 tons; and Pakistan, with 12 tons. In
1972 Turkey ceased all production and has not participated in licit opium sales since that
time. The Soviet Union consumes its production for domestic purposes. Iran devotes its
production to supplying its addict maintenance program. See notes 60-65 and accom-
panying text infra.
12 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at 5.
13 SPONG, supra note 7, at 2.
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amount is produced in the area known as the "fertile
triangle"-the border region encompassing northern Burma, Laos,
and Thailand. At least 750 tons of opium are harvested from this
region annually, the bulk of which (approximately 400 tons) is
consumed by the local populations. 14 The population is properly
classified as a "user," rather than an "addict" population. Opium
is eaten or smoked rather than injected, is used in its unrefined
(and therefore less addictive) form, and appears to function princi-
pally as a "social" drug, much the same way that alcohol is used
in the West.
The remainder of the harvest is collected in northern Thailand
and shipped south to Bangkok, Vientiane, and Hong Kong, which
are the major wholesale centers. Trafficking in the fertile triangle
is controlled by a number of unattached military forces. The most
notorious of these is composed of the remnants of the third and
fifth divisions of the Kuomintang, which controls the trade routes
through northern Thailand.' 5 In Burma traffic is conducted under
the aegis of the Kha Kweyei (Burma Self-Defense Forces),' 6 and
independent armed units in quasi-alliance with the Burmese army.
Also influential are the private armies of the major traffickers.
One of the largest of these, employed in the service of the narcot-
ics trafficker Lo Hsing Han, numbers over 1,000 men.' 7
Attempts to stem the flow of drugs from the fertile triangle have
been hampered by corrupt and incompetent Thai officials.18 There
have been signs of progress, however. A resettlement of some
guerilla forces in northern Thailand, together with the confiscation
and burning of their opium stocks, was accomplished in 1972 by
the Thai government. 19 Thai officials were able to arrest Lo Hsing
following a battle between his army and the Burmese army, 20 and
he was extradited to Burma for trial. Burma has recently passed
laws barring the cultivation, processing, or trafficking of opium
poppies and hemp. 2 ' Whether these and similar actions will have
any significant impact on the flow of illicit drugs from the region is
questionable, but they do provide a basis of some measure of
hope.
14 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at 25. See also SPONG, supra note 7, at 4.
15 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at 29.
16 Id. at 28.
17 See note 20 infra.
18 N.Y. Times, July 22. 1973, at 18, col. 5.
19 INCB REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
20 N.Y. Times, July 20, 1973, at 5, col. 4.
21 N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1974, at 20, col. 8.
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Having arrived at the wholesale distribution centers, the opium
is then dispersed throughout the Southeast Asia drug community.
Hong Kong supplies an estimated ten tons of morphine base and
fifty tons of opium annually to its 150,000 addicts, as well as
supplying large addict populations in Macao and the Philippines. 22
From Laos flows fifteen tons of opium annually to the Cholan
district of Vietnam, and lesser amounts to other areas in South
Vietnam and Laos. 23 Bangkok supplies the 150,000 Thai addicts
and a small but growing number of Burmese users.2 4
The Southeast Asia network experienced a period of rapid
growth during the Vietnam conflict. 25 With the withdrawal of
American troops from South Vietnam, the market was suddenly
reduced. 26 This, coupled with the severe curtailment in the supply
of heroin entering the United States through Europe,2 7 gave rise
to speculation that the organized enterprises of Southeast Asia
would attempt to expand their scope of operations to include the
United States domestic market. That such an attempt has oc-
curred is now confirmed, but, to date, large scale trafficking in
opiates from Southeast Asia to the United States has not ma-
terialized. This appears to be due to the fact that while the Asian
enterprises may have the ability to bring heroin to the United
States, they have no distribution network for their goods within
the market.28
b. Middle East/South Asia. 1. The South Asian Sub-Continent.
Second only to Southeast Asia in sheer volume of opium produc-
tions is the loosely defined "Middle East/South Asia" region. 9
As in Southeast Asia, most of the opium produced within this
region is consumed domestically. The patterns by which opium
moves throughout the region are complex, and the levels of so-
phistication both of illicit trafficking and of governmental activity
against it vary widely from state to state within the region. India
and Iran are the two principal consuming states, with Pakistan
and Afghanistan accounting for a relatively minor proportion of
22 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at 27.
23 Id. at 28.
24 Id. at 27. See also Spong, supra note 7, at 12. For many years the Thais were the
only non-Chinese ethnic group to engage in the widespread use of opiates.
I See note 100 infra.
26 id.
27 See notes 75-105 and accompanying text infra.
28 N.Y. Times, October 24, 1973, at 49, col. 3. Cf. N.Y. Times, March 26, 1974, at 69,
col. 2, describing a raid on two Chinese fraternal associations and four Chinatown clubs in
New York City.
29 SPONG, supra note 7, at 4. The region includes the nations of Turkey, Iran, India,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nepal.
FALL 19741
Journal of Law Reform
the regional consumption.a Virtually all of India's illicit opium
production is channeled into its domestic black marketP1 Addi-
tional opium enters India from Nepal3 2 and, increasingly, from
Afghanistan.3 3 For the most part, however, India may be regarded
as a closed subset of the region, at least insofar as international
traffic is concerned. Little Indian opium leaves the subcontinent;
little non-Indian opium enters.3 4
2. Iran. Iran has, at the same time, one of the world's largest
addict populations and a government deeply committed to eradi-
cating drug addiction within its borders. Through its efforts the
addict population has been reduced from an estimated 1.5 million
addicts in 1955 to approximately 400,000 at the present time. 5
During this time, Iran went from a policy of indifference to drug
abuse, to an absolute ban on all drug consumption, to a massive
drug maintenance program coupled with severe punishments for
drug traffickers.3 6 Like the United States, Iran is a "victim coun-
try," in that opium is illegally smuggled into the country despite
the government's preventive efforts.3 7 Until the Turkish ban on
opium production,3 8 opium primarily entered Iran from Turkey
and Afghanistan. Since the ban, Afghanistan and Pakistan have
become the major sources of smuggled opium in Iran.3 9 With
respect to Iran, at least, the fears that Afghanistan would supplant
Turkey as a source of illicit opium 40 have been confirmed.4 1
Afghani officials apparently regard drug addiction as a purely
foreign problem, 42 and are perhaps somewhat lax in their antinar-
30 Id. at 9.
31 Id.
32 N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1973, at 8, col. 3.
33 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at 30-3 1.
34 It is estimated that five to ten tons of opium are exported from India to the Arabian
Peninsula annually, and a like amount to the Far East. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at
155.
35 McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 6, at 470. This reflects a percentage decrease of
users to total population from 7 percent in 1955 to I percent at the present time. By
contrast, the United States with its 500,000 to 600,000 addicts, has an addict population of
between 0.25 percent and 0.3 percent of the total population.
36 Id. at 470-7 1.
37 Id. at 47 1.
38 See notes 102-105 and accompanying text infra.
39 The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is among the most porous in the world.
The border, 900 kilometers long, has only three customs posts, and nomadic tribes cross
freely. See WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at 32. Smuggling from Pakistan directly
into Iran is not a major problem, partially due to the good relations between the two
nations. McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 6, at 515.
40 INCB REPORT, supra note 2, at 20.
41 N.Y. Times, May 30, 1973, at 12, col. 1.
42 Id.
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cotics program. 43 Indeed, in 1973 Afghani farmers harvested a
bumper crop of opium on newly irrigated land developed with aid
from the United States.44
The principal drug smuggled over the Turkish border is not
opium, but morphine base, to be converted into heroin in western
Iran. 45 The difficulties involved in preventing such- smuggling are
enormous.
Almost 300 miles long, the Turkish border is highly moun-
tainous, making effective aerial or ground reconnaissance
difficult. Even if smugglers could be spotted, it would be
difficult to intercept them because there are so few roads
running along the border. Compounding an already impos-
sible situation are the many Kurdish tribesmen who live along
the frontier. These nomadic herders provide an ideal cover
for smuggling drugs as they move back and forth across the
border with their flocks. The government has to handle the
Kurds with care since historically there have been tensions
between the intensely independent Kurds on the one hand
and the Iranians on the other ....
[Slince morphine base is much less bulky than opium, it
can be carried over the border by individual smugglers . . .
[t]hus every man and woman who crosses the Turkish border
is a potential smuggler. 46
Yet even these problems appear minor when compared to those
of patrolling the 500-mile long Afghani-Iranian border.
Composed of mountains and deserts, the border is frequently
impassable in winter due to snow and in summer due to heat
and dust ....
The Afghans do not smuggle drugs individually but in large
bands. Moreover these Afghan tribesmen are desperate and
will take greater risks than their Turkish counterparts ...
Stories abound of Afghan chieftains who will hold a man's
family hostage in order to force him to smuggle drugs. If the
smuggling operation fails ... groups of smugglers have been
known to attack Iranian villages to bring ransom money back
to the chieftains ....
When they cross the border, these bands of Afghan tribes-
13 INCB REPORT, supra note 2, at 20-21.
4 See note 41 supra. It has been suggested that the Afghani Royal Family, since
overthrown, was implicated in the opium trade.
45 McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 6, at 510. The Government of Iran estimates that
there are about 10,000 heroin addicts in the country. Most are concentrated in urban
areas. Id. at 478.
46 Id. at 510.
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men number anywhere from 10 to 100 and carry as much as
two tons of opium or hashish tied to animals' backs. The
smugglers carry military weapons and will fight to the death if
intercepted by the Gendarmes, with large gun battles being
the rule .... 47
The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie has recently been strength-
ened by the acquisition of large quantities of mechanized equip-
ment, including motorcycles, helicopter gunships, and night vision
devices.48 In addition, both the United States and the United
Nations have provided technical advisers. 49
In 1969, following a fourteen-year attempt to eradicate addic-
tion by the total prohibition of opium growth and consumption, 50
the Iranian government decided to revise its strategy. Total prohi-
bition, while reducing the number of addicts, had failed to elim-
inate the problem of addiction. Being unable to supply their habit
from domestic sources, the remaining addicts were compelled to
buy imported opium-at substantially higher prices. A sizeable
international black market had grown up to service the demands
of these addicts.51 The more proficient the government became at
eliminating domestic sources of supply, the more profitable be-
came the international black market, until it became so lucrative
that the amount of money leaving the country began to affect the
balance of payments. 52 In addition, the apprehension and in-
carceration of thousands of Iranian addicts was having a deleteri-
ous effect on the economy. 53 It was for these reasons that the
government decided to shift its emphasis away from the user and
toward the smuggler.
The policy, which remains in effect at the present time, has two
elements. In order to make the smuggling operation itself more
difficult, Iran has increased the quality and quantity of border
patrols, provided the Gendarmerie with mechanized capability
and sophisticated weaponry, and adopted military trial5" and the
death penalty for convicted smugglers.5 5 In order to eliminate the
47 Id. at 51 1.
48 Id. at 512.
49 Id. at 510.
50 id. at 495-98.
51 Id. at 497.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 498.
54 Id. at 513.
55 Id. at 498. One effect of this policy has been to induce Afghani smugglers to travel in
still larger bands and to carry greater firepower. With little chance of pardon, there is little
reason not to fight to the death. Id. at 514.
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market for illicit drugs, the Government permits limited opium
production under careful government supervision and distributes
this opium to registered addicts. 5 6
Every year the Government licenses farmers to grow opium on
condition that they agree to sell the entire harvest at a price fixed
by the Ministry of Land Reform.57 In order to prevent crops from
being diverted to illicit buyers, the Government pays the farmers
far more for their opium than the black market can afford. 58 This
practice is coupled with very strict security controls before and
during harvest. 59 After harvest, the gum is processed into pre-
pared opium. Although the controls are rigid, it is estimated that
there may in fact be as much as 5 percent leakage at this stage.60
Once processed, the opium is made available to registered addicts
under a government maintenance program. An addict may register
in the program if he is over sixty years of age or is too ill to
undergo withdrawal and detoxification. 61 Officials claim that there
are now 110,000 registered addicts. 6 2 Estimates of the number of
unregistered addicts range from 90,000 to 190,000.63
The most serious deficiency in this scheme is the severe lack of
drug treatment facilities. For a total addict population of 400,000
there are probably less than 400 beds set aside exclusively for
addiction withdrawal.6 4 There is almost no after-care treatment
available.65 The government is now in the process of constructing
56 Id. at 498.
57 Id. at 499.
58 In 1972 the Iranian Government purchased opium from their farmers at the price of
approximately $120/kilogram. Id. at 500. As a rule of thumb, illicit buyers must pay twice
the licit price to induce farmers to divert their opium to them.
59 McLaughlin & Quinn write:
When acreage is approved for cultivation, it is roped off. As the crop appears,
anything growing outside the ropes is uprooted and destroyed. Shortly before
harvesting, the farmer or rural cooperative on whose land the opium is being
grown must notify a representative of the Ministry or the Imperial Iranian
Gendarmerie of the impending harvest. In order to prevent possible diver-
sion, the gendarmes may often billet themselves near the opium fields ....
As the bowls of gum are collected, they are delivered directly either to the
representative of the Ministry or to the gendarmes .... If any illegal conduct
is uncovered, the poppy fields are to be destroyed.
Id. at 50 1.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 503.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 506. In an attempt to induce these addicts to register without incarceration, a
system of civil penalties has been devised. For example, a student who is found to be an
addict is suspended from school until he can prove he is no longer addicted, and the matter
is reported to his parents. Id. at 506-07.
64 Id, at 508.
5 Id.
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six new rehabilitation centers. Although the first center was com-
pleted in 1971, it remains empty because there are no trained
personnel to staff it.66
Iran has promised to cease opium production when its neigh-
bors agree to do so as well. The Turkish opium ban, had it
remained in effect, might well have elicited some response from
Iran. 67 However, in light of the decision to partially rescind it68
and in light of the present inability of Pakistan and Afghanistan to
promulgate or to enforce such a ban, it is unlikely that Iran will
act on its promise in the foreseeable future.69
c. The United States. In all the world, there is no drug as
deadly or as far-reaching in its consequences as heroin. In all the
world, no nation consumes more heroin than the United States.
Yet it has only been within the last few years that the United
States has even begun to undertake a serious commitment to deal
with domestic heroin addiction. As long as the ravages of addic-
tion were confined to the inner city, the problem was largely
ignored. Only with the spread of heroin out of the core cities into
suburban areas did the problem gain national recognition and
merit a concerted national response. 70
Prior to the Turkish ban on poppy growth 71 the various ways in
which heroin was smuggled into the United States were well
66/d.
67 Id. at 502.
68 See notes 124-140 and accompanying text infra.
69 McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 6, at 502. Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan con-
trols the tribal areas in which most of their poppies are grown, and thus even if imposed, a
ban on poppy growth could not be enforced without outside aid. The United Nations
International Narcotics Control Board has stated that a regional approach to the problem
is absolutely essential. See INCB REPORT, supra note 2, at 16. Complicating the problem
is the apparent high level corruption in Afghanistan (see notes 34-37 supra) and the
beleaguered state of the Afghani police force. Only 10-20 percent are literate, the average
wage is $2.00 per month, and they are ill equipped. In addition, quite apart from the
problems of corruption and enforcement, the tribal chiefs exert enormous political
influence on the governments, and the economic hardships of an effective ban on poppy
production would be severe, McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 6, at 515.
70 See "U.S. Supports U.N. Programs Against Drug Abuse," a statement by Congress-
man Buchanan in Comm. Ill (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) of the United Nations
General Assembly, Nov. 28, 1973, in 70 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 125 (Feb. 4, 1974), at
125:
• .. [W]e have attacked drug abuse on all fronts-supply, trafficking, and
demand. The Federal Government, for example, now spends 10 times as
much ... as it did on the treatment of drug addiction four and a half years
ago.
Cf. 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 180:
They knew they had the problem in Harlem. Most of us didn't know what
the problem was until it moved into the other areas such as the middle-class
neighborhoods and the more wealthy neighborhoods.
7t See notes 103-106 and accompanying text infra.
International Drug Control
established and well known. Approximately 80 percent of the
heroin entering the United States had its origin in the poppy fields
of Turkey; 72 of the remaining 20 percent, most came from Mexi-
co. 73 Almost all of the illicit Turkish heroin came from diversion
from the licit crop. 74 Once harvested, the opium was converted
to morphine base in southern Turkey. 75 Two routes developed to
carry the morphine base from Turkey. Morphine being smuggled
by sea was shipped out of ports on the south coast of Turkey or
from those in Lebanon or Syria, and was delivered to the port of
Marseilles. 76 With the increase in free movement through Europe
and the increased pressure applied by French and United States
officials against traffic in the Marseilles area,77 an overland route
developed. Morphine base, carried in sealed trucks, 78 was trans-
ported through Bulgaria and Greece either to Austria and the
Federal Republic of Germany or. through Italy into France.79
Morphine entering France was processed in heroin labs located in
the vicinity of Marseilles and increasingly in other urban areas as
well. 80 Drugs moving through the Federal Republic of Germany
were refined in cities along the route,81 and were shipped out of
German North Sea ports.
There are three routes for the transportation of heroin from
Europe to the United States. The oldest and most active was that
of direct shipment from Europe to the United States, 82 usually
through the Port of New York. The vast quantities of cargo and
72 SPONG, supra note 7, at 8. See also N.Y. Times, March 13, 1974, at 8, col. 4.
73 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at A57.
74 Id. at 18; see also SPONG, supra note 7, at 7.
71 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at 18.761d. at 20.
77 See "French-United States Agreement Concerning Action Against Narcotic and
Dangerous Drug Traffic," signed Feb. 26, 1971, 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 235 (1971);
discussed in 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 336 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Agreement].
78 SPONG, supra note 7, at 7-8:
Operating in great numbers under international customs agreements, these
sealed trucks are usually allowed to travel across various national frontiers
with little or no control; systematic inspection is precluded both by the
vastness of the task and the growing emphasis within Europe upon free
movement of people and goods.
79 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at 21.
80 Id. at 22. This diversification is largely in response to the pressure being brought to
bear by narcotics officials in the Marseilles area. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
81 Id. at 20.
82 In 1971, U.S. authorities seized 1309 pounds of heroin, or about 6 percent of the total
demand. Of this amount, 537 pounds were seized in Region il, which is roughly coexten-
sive with the Port of New York. The Marselles-New York narcotics traffic has come to be
popularly known as the "French Connection." See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note
3. at 2.
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individuals moving through the Port Authority has led the Comp-
troller General to conclude that:
Although the existence of an inspection function provides
some deterrent, the enormous customs workload and the
many responsibilities of inspectors render it doubtful that
customs inspections can have a significant impact on heroin
smuggling.83
The enormous difficulties in inspection alone are illustrated:
An appreciation of this "needle in a haystack" situation can
be obtained from the following theoretical, but typical ex-
ample. One cargo invoice covers a shipment of 10 containers,
each container holds 100 cartons, each carton contains 24
teapots, in individual boxes, and one teapot contains heroin.8 4
The Port of New York processes more than 1.4 million in-
voices every year.85 In addition, there are hundreds of miles of
coastline where small boats can land surreptitiously and thereby
entirely avoid the minimal danger of a customs seizure.
The two principal dangers to smugglers of the direct Eu-
rope-United States route are that seizures, when made, tend to be
quite large8 6 and that there is a greater possibility that an arrest of
a drug courier in New York might implicate an entire smuggling
operation in Europe. 7 In order to minimize this danger, alternate
routes through Canada, Mexico, and Latin America came into
being. 8
In 1970, the United States intensified its diplomatic effort to
secure bilateral and multilateral drug enforcement agreements
aimed at disrupting the flow of heroin into the United States. The
drive had three goals: the securing of agreements to halt the
growth of opium; the securing of agreements to make smuggling
itself more difficult; and the unilateral strengthening of customs
and other domestic anti-smuggling activities.89
83 Id. at 19.
4 Id. at 16.
85 Id.
86 Out of the thirty-eight seizures in Region II in 1971, five seizures accounted for 537
pounds and thirty-three for the remaining two pounds. Id. at 29.
87 SPONG, supra note 7, at 8. See also Agreement, supra note 77, at 336.
88 SPONG, supra note 7, at 8. Following the increased pressure on the direct Eu-
rope-U.S. route and the Turkish ban on opium cultivation, the South American and
Mexican routes became much more important.
89 See 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 76. Also included was a broadly stated goal of
drug education and rehabilitation. This includes everything from the Methadone Mainte-
nance Programs to the dissemination of drug information to youth. It has been suggested
that the results of these programs, as put into effect, has been to increase rather than
decrease interest and experimentation in drugs.
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The program has had mixed success. Although claimed at the
time to have been a successful cooperative venture between the
United States and Mexico, 90 "Operation Intercept," the first ma-
jor attempt to interdict drug traffic at the borders, was later
acknowledged to have been essentially counterproductive not
only because it failed to intercept narcotics, but also because it
unnecessarily exacerbated relations between the United States
and Mexico.91 The operation was described as "an example of an
'economic squeeze' which prompted a foreign government to en-
force tighter control."9 2 Shortly thereafter, the two countries in-
itiated "Operation Cooperation." Widely lauded, "Operation Co-
operation" was a program under which, with United States tech-
nical assistance, Mexico undertook to eradicate the illicit growth
of opium and marijuana in the Mexican interior.93
The United States Congress entertained a number of proposals
authorizing the President to suspend military and economic assis-
tance to any nation refusing to cooperate in interdicting the flow
of drugs to the United States.9 4 This power has never, in fact,
been utilized. The doubtful utility of such a proposal has been
suggested.
[W]ithdrawal of aid will not directly affect dollars taken into
the economy from the sale of opium, because no nation, not
even India, makes any significant gain in its coffers from
opium. Withdrawal of aid will not be directed at cutting down
opium revenues; instead it will affect all programs financed by
90 Id. at 17 1.
91 WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at A58.
92 Operation Intercept was described in the following terms:
For weeks, Customs Bureau officials searched all vehicles at certain
checkpoints, causing a traffic holdup which dissuaded American tourists from
crossing the border and thus badly hurting the Mexican economy ....
Obviously, illegal traffickers have gone elsewhere as a result of such close
scrutiny but the fact remains that Operation Intercept succeeded in that it
jogged the Mexican Government itself into action.
See 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 171. It is difficult to understand this operation as a
cooperative venture between the Mexican and United States Governments, as it was
portrayed. This was observed in discussion during the course of the hearing:
It was no cooperative effort with Mexico, it was strictly a unilateral project.
Mexico had no idea that Intercept was coming . . . . Unfortunately we have
almost 2000 miles of border with Mexico ... and you cannot patrol all that
border effectively. Most of the illicit drugs that come from Mexico do not
come through ports of entry .... Children coming across to school or just
coming across with a lunch box would be stopped, their sandwiches opened
.... They even looked in babies' diapers .... I don't know that it did too
much for good will and understanding between the two nations.
Id. at 180.
93 Id. at 171, 18 1. See also WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 8, at A58.
94 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 222.
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foreign aid. This means that in Pakistan, for example, all
health programs, all school programs, and all construction
programs will be eliminated because the country cannot seem
to cope with an illicit drug program within its borders. Quite
simply, if a 'country were not able to control illegal opium, it
would not be reasonable to suppose that the denial of funds
used for meeting the basic living needs of the populace would
spark the transference of other funds to an opium control
system. Rather, other funds would be shifted to take the place
of the retracted money. 95
Pressure has been brought to bear on a number of opium
growing and processing countries, with some success. Nepal has
been induced to ban poppy cultivation; 96 Panama, known for
years as a major transshipment point of heroin and cocaine, has
substantially improved its antinarcotics efforts; 9 7 Colombia has
vowed to "commit the necessary economic resources" to fight
against narcotics; 98 Thailand, Burma, and South Vietnam claim to
have made progress in breaking up drug traffic; 99 Laos has for-
mally prohibited the growing of opium; 100 and Chile has taken
steps against the movement of cocaine destined for the United
States through Santiago. 101 Agreements have been concluded with
France, the Republic of Germany, and Italy enhancing bilateral
cooperation in drug enforcement efforts. 102
(1) The Turkish ban: implementation and effects. By far the
most significant achievement of the United States effort was the
agreement with Turkey in which the Turkish government agreed
to ban poppy cultivation and opium production. The ban was
formally announced on June 30, 1971, by decree of Prime Min-
95 Id. at 192.
96 N.Y. Times, July 8, 1973, at 30, col. 4; N.Y. Times, August 13, 1973, at 8, col. 3.
97 N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1973, at 4, col. 1.
98 N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1973, at 17, col. 4.
99 On June 29, 1974, the United States signed an agreement with Burma to provide six
civilian model utility helicopters for assistance in its narcotics control program. The
helicopters, which are to be delivered in 1975, are to be used for narcotics suppression
purposes, and, specifically, to attack heroin laboratories and large groups of heavily armed
smugglers. Provision is made for an additional twelve helicopters to be delivered to Burma
in 1976 and 1977, contingent on appropriations and the successful utilization of the initial
six. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Press Release No. 274, July 1, 1974. For the agreement
itself, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Press Release No. 278, July 2, 1974. See also N.Y.
Times, July 12, 1973, at 7, col. 6 (Thailand); N.Y. Times, July 5, 1973, at 32, col. 2 (South
Vietnam); N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1973, at 8, col. 3 (Burma).
100 Hearings on Executive J Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. at 64 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Executive J]. These were
the hearings on the ratification of the Protocol to the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 1961.
101 N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1973, at 11, col. 1.
102 N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1973, at 35, col. 6.
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ister Erim, 10 3 and was the culmination of a program begun in
1967; during that program, the number of provinces in which
poppy cultivation was authorized was progressively reduced from
twenty-one to nine. The decree limited poppy cultivation to four
provinces in the 197l-1972 growing season, and thereafter prohib-
ited cultivation altogether. In exchange, the United States agreed
to give Turkey $35 million. Of this sum, $15 million was to
compensate for losses in foreign exchange as a result of the ban 10 4
and $20 million was to provide assistance for programs designed
to provide alternative sources of income for Turkish poppy farm-
ers. 1
0 5
The agreement was significant because Turkey was the source
of a great deal of the heroin entering the United States. Although
Turkey's total output of illicit opium was a relatively small frac-
tion of the world's production, fully 80 percent of the heroin
entering the United States originated in Turkey. 10 6 While no one
expected the Turkish ban to end the illicit entry of heroin into the
United States, it was hoped that by denying traffickers 80 percent
of their source materials, established traffic patterns would be
disrupted, the amount of heroin entering the United States would
diminish, lines of supply would be attenuated, and major
traffickers would be exposed. At the same time, officials were
acutely aware that smuggling operations would seek to reestablish
themselves along new routes and with new sources. 10
7
Much of this has come to pass. The amount of heroin entering
the United States directly from Europe has sharply declined, 0 8
and for a time heroin was in short supply in New Jersey. 0 9 The
quality of the product suffered as well; it was estimated that street
heroin was at one point only one-third as pure as it had been
before the implementation of the ban. The use of methadone as a
substitute was on the rise. 110
There is evidence that the anticipated development of Turkey
as a transshipment point from fields further east appears to have
103 SPONG, supra note 7, at 16-17; 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 131; Hearings on
Executive J, supra note 100, at 64.
104 Then estimated at $3-5 million annually. 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 159.
105 SPONG, supra note 7, at 17.
106 Id. at 8;_see also INCB REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
107 N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 6. See also SPONG, supra note 7, at 8, 17. It
was anticipated that Bolivia, Colombia, Laos, Nepal, and Singapore were likely to become
future sources of illicit drugs. Hearings on Executive J, supra note 100, at 66.
108 N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1973, at 49, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1974, at 14, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1973, at 20, col. I.
109 N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1973, at 74, col. 8.
110 N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1973, at 58. col. 3.
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been confirmed.11' Also anticipated was the increased reliance
upon South American smuggling routes. Routings through Monte-
video, Buenos Aires, and Panama City, previously active, were
subjected to increasingly heavy traffic. 1" 2 More recently, Dade
County, Florida, has become a major entry point for both heroin
and cocaine from South America and Mexico. From there it is
brought to the New York area by individual couriers. The illicit
traffic in Florida is apparently controlled by Cuban nationals and
is extremely difficult to infiltrate. " 3
(2) The Mexican traffic. What was not foreseen was the
enormous capacity of the illicit Mexican growers to fill the void
created by the Turkish ban. If this ability is any indication, then
"Operation Cooperation" must be adjudged a failure. Opium,
although illegal in Mexico, is grown in remote, inaccessible
mountain areas. The Mexican Government has been unable to
prevent illicit opium growing. The first public acknowledgement
by a federal official that the influx of Mexican heroin was becom-
ing a serious problem did not occur until September, 1973.1 14 In
December, Food and Drug Administration Regional Director
Lewis charged that brown heroin from Mexico was beginning to
appear in New Jersey." 5 In Detroit, the largest heroin seizure in
the city's history took place in June, 1974-of brown heroin from
Mexico." 6 A more dramatic demonstration of the increased vol-
ume of illicit drugs entering the United States from Mexico came
earlier in 1974, when a massive five-week operation along the
Mexican border resulted in the seizure of $16 million worth of
illicit drugs. 117
On June 10,1974, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
officials inicated that Mexico had supplanted Europe as the prima-
ry source of heroin entering the United States, and that Mexican
heroin had become so popular that dealers were baking their
111 N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1973, at 74, col. 8.
112 SPONG, supra note 7, at 8. Cf. note 97, supra.
113 N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1973, at 89, col. 5.
114 N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1973, at 20, col. 1. The statement was made by Mr. Bartels,
then Acting Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration. It is interesting to note that
on September 11, 1973 President Nixon announced, "We have turned the corner on drug
addiction." Id.
115 N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1973, at 74, col. 8. "Brown" heroin is distinguished from
"white" heroin by the process by which it is refined. Mexican heroin is darker than
Turkish (or European) heroin. There is no difference in potency attributable to the color or
the refining process.
116 "CBS Evening News," June 1, 1974.
117 N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1974, at 29, col. 2. Included in the seizures were twenty-six
tons of marijuana.
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stocks of European heroin to turn it brown.118 The respite, if ever
there was one, brought about by the Turkish ban had ended.
The border between the United States and Mexico seems im-
possible to adequately patrol, and this is certainly a substantial
part of the problem of interdiction. Contrabandista smuggling has
been an established art for years, and the introduction of heroin
smuggling through Mexico did not, therefore, require the estab-
lishment of a new smuggling network. Heroin was simply one
more lucrative commodity to be smuggled. The thousands of
private airfields in Texas make smuggling by light private plane
virtually undetectable. In the absence of an "Operation In-
tercept," automobiles are also a reliable method of smuggling. 119
Much smuggling is also done by individual couriers, crossing the
Rio Grande on foot.' 2 0
The effect of the Turkish ban in Europe has been mixed. In
Yugoslavia it has become so difficult for pharmacists to obtain
raw opium that the Government has undertaken a campaign to
encourage Macedonian farmers to begin cultivating poppies as a
cash crop.' 2 ' Elsewhere in Europe, the ban, while certainly
affecting the trafficking organizations, does not appear to have had
much effect of the use of drugs. Heroin, although in use, is still
relatively uncommon. 2 2 It may be that the limited quantity avail-
able is in itself a factor tending to keep the user population small.
In any event, there is no indication that the addict populations
have shown any propensity to dramatically increase since the ban,
nor is there any evidence that they have experienced any sig-
118 Interview with Mr. Vernier, Drug Enforcement Administration, "CBS Evening
News," June 10, 1974.
1'9 The side panels of automobiles also appear to be a favored place of concealment for
heroin smuggled from Europe to the United States via the Port of New York. COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL, supra note 3, at 25. The resourcefulness of even small smuggling oper-
ations is illustrated by the following anecdote: Three soldiers stationed in Texas near the
Mexican border decided to go into the business of bringing marijuana across the border
into the United States. Accordingly, they carefully observed the automobiles being
searched at the customs post, and noticed that certain types and models of automobiles
were stopped more frequently than were others. Armed with this information, they pooled
their resources and purchased the model they thought least likely to be stopped. Thereafter
they made a most comfortable living transporting marijuana from Mexico to the base at
which they were stationed, although only one of them drove the automobile. The operation
continued until the driver left the army. As a token of gratitude for the added risk he had
taken (although he was never stopped), the other two gave him the automobile. (Personal
interview).
120 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 180.
121 N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1973, at 9, col. I.
122 SPONG, supra note 7, at 18.
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nificantly greater difficulty in supplying themselves with heroin.123
(3) Repeal of the Turkish ban. When the decree was first
introduced, it was a subject of bitter controversy in Turkey. There
is no addiction problem in Turkey,124 and the poppy is used for
for any number of things. The oil is used for cooking, the seeds
for flavor, and the plant itself for fuel and fodder. It is also by far
the most lucrative cash crop available to the Turkish farmers,125
who have been planting it for literally hundreds of years. More-
over, there was a strong feeling that the Turkish government had
capitulated under United States pressure.126
At the time the ban was promulgated it was believed, in Turkey
and the United States, that the controversy would diminish. 127
Unfortunately, this was not the case. The poppy became a cam-
paign issue, the challengers promising that, if elected, the farmers
would be growing poppies again by 1974,128 and the government
of Prime Minister Erim was defeated.
On February 14, 1974, Turkey notified the United States of its
intention to resume the cultivation of the opium poppy. 129 The
claim was made that $35 million in U.S. aid was insufficient to
compensate for the deprivations suffered by the farmers,1 30 and
that the poppy shortage was to the Turks at least as important and
as crippling as the gasoline shortage was to the Americans.13 1
Despite a threatened elimination of aid to Turkey,13 2 in March
123 This may be due to the fact that there were, and remain, unknown quantities of
opium, morphine base, and heroin stockpiled from Turkish harvests prior to the 1972 ban.
It is reasonable to assume that these stockpiles would be able to service the European
addict population for years. Cf. note 132 infra.
124 SPONG, supra note 7, at 16.
125 Gross returns per acre:
O pium (licit sales) ....................................................... $160-200
Sugar beets .................................................................... $ 142
A lfalfa ......................................................................... $ 73
Sunflow er ...................................................................... $ 59
W heat .......................................................................... $ 29
B arley .......................................................................... $ 27
Id. Recall that the farmer receives twice the licit price if he sells to illicit traffickers.
126 Id. at 17.
127 Id.
128 N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
129 N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 4, col. 4.
13 0 N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1974 at 8, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1974, at 8, col. 3.
141 N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1974, at 37, col. 3.
132 N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1974, at 40, col. I. See also SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF A STUDY MISSION TO TURKEY, MAR. 14-16,
1974 (Comm. Print 1974) ("The Politics of the Poppy"), discussing the history of the ban
and the reasons for its repeal. Citing the enormous importance of the ban in breaking the
"French Connection", the strong feelings that the ban has engendered among Turkish
people and politicians, and the likelihood that poppy cultivation will again be permitted,
the report suggests (at v) that the "possible rescission of the poppy ban could form the
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1974 poppy cultivation resumed at six state farms in Anatolia.13 3
On the first of July, Premier Ecevit of Turkey formally rescinded
the ban, authorizing the general resumption of poppy growing.13 4
On July 5, 1974 the United States recalled its ambassador to
Turkey.
Congressional reaction was swift and angry. Within two weeks
a resolution signed by 238 members of the House of Representa-
tives urging the halt of all economic and military aid to Turkey
was presented to President Nixon.' 3 6 Shortly thereafter both the
House of Representatives 3 7 and the Senate'38 passed bills halting
such aid to Turkey and all other opium-growing nations which fail
to prevent the illegal diversion of heroin into the American mar-
ket. The House of Representatives voted to order the United
States Import-Export Bank to refuse to deal with Turkey until
opium cultivation is ceased.' 39 It is too early to assess the effect
of the Turkish decision. Only forty-five acres of poppies were
sown, 140 which is hardly enough to make any difference even if
some is diverted into the illicit drug stream. It is unlikely that any
opium will in fact be diverted; the small area involved, the fact
that the poppy is being grown on state farms, and the intense
international interest focused on the Turkish action combine to
make it likely that the Turkish government will implement ex-
tremely strict security measures. The new crop will not be pro-
cessed for some time, and Turkey has repeatedly pledged to
implement strict controls to ensure that opium is sold only on the
most serious Turkish-United States crisis since the end of World War II." The report
makes the following proposals in the hope of avoiding a "disastrous disruption" of
Turkish-United States relations: vastly expanded and improved controls over any new
crop planted, to be supervised by an international body; continued U.S. support of Turkish
crop diversification programs and the abandonment of marginal farming areas in favor of
industrialization of these areas; cultivation of poppies for their seeds and other by-products
with a continued prohibition of opium gum; and encouraged Turkish understanding of the
international nature of the drug problem. Acknowledging that these measures have prac-
tically no chance of avoiding a frontal confrontation between the United States and
Turkey, the report concludes:
If Turkey disregards the real dangers which renewed poppy production
presents to the American people then this matter must be brought before the
Congress to review any and all agreements between the two nations.
Id. at i1. This report was issued prior to the Greek-Turkish dispute on Cyprus.
133 N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1974, at 8, col. 3.
134 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1974, at 4, col. 4.
135 "NBC Nightly News," July 5, 1974; N.Y. Times, July 6, 1974, at 1. col. 6.
136 N.Y. Times, July 10, 1974, at 11, col. 2.
137 N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1974, at 36, col. 2.
138 N.Y. Times, July 12, 1974, at 5, col. I.
139 N.Y. Times, Aug. I, 1974, at 3, col. 5.
1
o See note 133 supra.
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international pharmaceutical market. 141 Certainly the Turkish ac-
tion has damaged relations between the United States and Tur-
key. It remains to be seen whether sufficient pressure can be
brought to bear to compel Turkey to reinstate the ban in the
future. But the issue has now become a highly emotional one on
both sides, and the repeal of the ban is now seen in Turkey as an
expression of nationalism. In addition, other strategic factors may
prevent the United States from bringing further pressure to bear.
By any measure, it is a major set-back in the struggle against illicit
narcotics.
B. Marijuana, Cocaine, and Psychotropic Substances
While the control of opium and its derivatives remains the
greatest and most urgent task confronting international drug con-
trol efforts, there has been a widespread increase in the use of all
sorts of drugs. These drugs may be classified into three cate-
gories: marijuana and hashish, coca and cocaine, and a loosely
defined group of psychotropic substances -drugs of synthetic ori-
gin. With the exception of certain of the psychotropics, none of
these drugs are as devastating as heroin. With the exception of
marijuana, none are as widespread.142
1. Marijuana and Hashish. -Although traditionally classified
along with more dangerous drugs, marijuana and hashish have not
commanded the same attention in practice. They are not addic-
tive, and the suggestion that they "lead to the use of other drugs"
has long been disproven. Many countries that prohibit the use of
other drugs have legalized the use of marijuana. 143
While international and national efforts to interdict traffic in
marijuana and hashish have by no means been abandoned, 144 as
much emphasis is placed on the implications of the traffic as on
the traffic itself. Thus, for example, the United States has ex-
pressed concern over the hashish smuggling route extending from
Afghanistan through Iran and Turkey into Europe, not principal-
141 N.Y. Times, July 9, 1974, at 19, col. 3; N.Y. Times, July 6, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
142 Although as a group psychotropic substances are surely more widely used than are
opium or opium products, no single substance within that classification can claim such
world wide popularity.
'43 In the United States, the state of Oregon and several municipalities have either
eliminated or drastically reduced penalties for the use of marijuana. Canada has from time
to time given thought to removing all criminal penalties for marijuana use.
'44 See note 115 supra.
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ly because of the hashish, but because the route might easily be
expanded to include opium and morphine base. 145
The marijuana plant grows to a height of three to four feet, and
has variegated leaves and a tough, fibrous stem. It will grow in
almost any climate, and may even be grown indoors, but thrives
best in hot regions with plentiful rainfall. The very ease with
which it may be grown (it requires practically no care) makes any
attempt to describe specific smuggling networks an exercise in
futility. The female plant is more potent than the male, and plants
from tropical climates more potent than those grown in temperate
regions. In the United States, the most popular imports come
from Panama, Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico. 146
After it has reached maturity, the plant is harvested. The stem
is cut as near the base as possible, and the plant is hung upside
down for several days in order to allow the resin in the stem to
run down into the leaves.' 47 The leaves are allowed to dry, and if
for export, are pressed into bricks. Only the leaves, flowers, and
seeds are consumed; the stems, having almost no potency, are
generally discarded.
The street price of marijuana in the United States fluctuates
according to supply, quality, and place of origin,' 48 but generally
stays within a range of from $15 to $25 per ounce. Because of this
relatively low price, an entrepreneur who hopes to make a size-
able profit must deal in great bulk, dramatically increasing the
chances of apprehension. These two factors have encouraged
organizations to concentrate on more profitable and "safe" drugs,
leaving marijuana smuggling to small groups and individuals. This,
in turn, has tended to limit trans-oceanic smuggling, for these
small groups and individuals rarely have either the contacts or the
wherewithal to engage in such practices.
Hashish is the pure resinous extract of the flower of the female
marijuana plant, and is as much as eight times more potent than
marijuana.' 49 Quality varies widely, with the world's best hashish
145 N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 6; see also McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note
6. at 518.
146 Southeast Asian marijuana is reputedly very potent and highly desirable, but the cost
of transportation makes the price prohibitive for all but the wealthier connoisseur.
147 Sometimes the plant is not cut but merely uprooted. Depending on the need for
discretion the leaves may be baked in the sun or not baked at all, and the step involving
hanging the plant upside down may be omitted.
148 For example, "Panama Red" commands a higher price than Mexican, which is in
turn more expensive than domestically grown marijuana.
149 McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 6, at 479.
110 Accordingly there is at least one readily identified and well established smuggling
network, originating in Afghanistan and servicing the Western European and United States
market. Hashish is a popular drug among U.S. servicemen in the Federal Republic of
Germany. See also note 139 and accompanying text supra.
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reputed to originate in Afghanistan. 150 The retail price is between
$20 and $30 per gram. While there is some organized smuggling
of hashish into the United States from Europe, most enters the
United States from Mexico, via contrabandista smuggling in small
aircraft, fishing boats, and automobiles.
The subject of the effects of marijuana and hashish has long
been a fruitful source of controversy, often bordering on hys-
teria.151 The short term effects include a sense of well-being,
visual and auditory distortions, heightened awareness to music,
craving for particular foods, and a feeling of relaxation and sleep-
iness. The effects last only a few hours, and there are no reported
after-effects. Although there continues to be disagreement, it has
been established that marijuana and hashish are not physically or
psychologically addicting, do not lead to the use of other drugs,
and are physically no more damaging than tobacco.152 Recently,
however, a new form of hashish has appeared, known as "hash
oil". It is the liquid distillate of pure marijuana resin, and is far
stronger and far more expensive than either marijuana or hashish.
It is not now widespread, perhaps because of its expense, perhaps
because of its novelty, and little is known of its effects. A few
drops of the substance placed on a cigarette is said to be equiv-
alent in potency to the best marijuana. What its effects would be if
taken in a more concentrated form, or what its long term effects
may be, are open to question.
2. Cocaine and Coca.- Cocaine is produced from leaves of the
coca bush, which is indigenous to the eastern slopes of the Andes
Mountains. It may be found as far south as Chile and as far north
as Venezuela, at altitudes of from 2,000 to 6,000 feet.' 53
In appearance, the plant resembles a blackthorn bush and will
normally grow to a height of six feet in the coca plantations.
Harvesting of the plant may begin when the plant is two or
three years old and continues for about twenty years. Due to
the rapid growth of the vegetation on the lower slopes of the
Andes, there may be as many as four harvests of the coca
plant each year. 154
The leaves themselves are not addicting, 155 and have long been
151The 1930's movie Reefer Madness is a good example of this phenomenon.
152 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA (1972).
153 McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation of a Dangerous Drug, 58 CORN-
ELL L. REV. 539 (1973), at 537 [hereinafter cited as McLaughlin: Cocaine].
154 Id. at 539 (footnotes omitted).
155 When the Peruvian army banned the use of coca, Indian recruits had no
trouble giving up coca chewing when fed an adequate diet.
Id. at 542.
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used by Indian tribes in the area as an appetite suppressant and as
a stimulant. 156 "Because the stimulating properties of cultivated
coca plants are considered greater than those of wild plants, the
leaves of the former are preferred for chewing."' 157 Bolivia and
Peru, the two largest coca growing countries, produce between
12,000 and 15,000 tons of coca leaves annually, most of which is
consumed locally. 158
Cocaine is an alkaloid of the coca leaf, and was introduced as
an anesthetic and as a cure for morphine addiction following the
American Civil War.159 It also gained widespread popularity in
intellectual circles and as an ingredient in patent medicines.' 60
Coca leaves were used as flavoring agents in soft drinks sold in
the United States.161
Use of cocaine has largely been confined to the United States,
several South American states, and certain intellectual circles
in Western Europe. More effective anesthetics have replaced co-
caine in accepted medical practice. A growing awareness of its
toxic effects, coupled with strong governmental regulations
against its use and distribution, almost eliminated it from use, at
least in the United States.' 62
Several factors may have contributed to its recent growth in
popularity. Former heroin addicts enrolled in methadone mainte-
nance programs are said to use cocaine because it may be taken
without visible signs of use.' 6 3 The drug is also becoming socially
acceptable in professional classes, for whom its effects of reducing
fatigue and increasing mental awareness are particularly attrac-
tive.' 64 With the increased pressure on heroin traffic, many deal-
156 Id. at 539.
157 Id. at 541.
158 Id. It is estimated that 90 percent of the Indians in the Andes use coca. Id. at 545.
159 Id. at 546.
160
Freud himself used cocaine and wrote glowingly of the exhilaration and
lasting euphoria it produced. Charles Baudelaire and Robert Lewis Steven-
son were both known to have used the drug.
Id. at 545-46. It it is generally believed that Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Edgar Allen Poe
used cocaine. And, of course, so did Sherlock Holmes.
161 Id. at 546.
"I As late as 1969, Doctor Sidney Cohen in his book The Drug Dilemma termed
cocaine "a negligible factor in drug misuse, except among heroin users and isolated
hipsters who will try anything." Id. at 537.
The drug loses potency over time and is more expensive than heroin. Usage has traditi-
onally been restricted to the wealthy. Id. at 548.
16 Id. at 555-56.
164 Id. at 556. Cocaine is also used as an aphrodisiac.
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ers and addicts turned to cocaine, and imports dramatically in-
creased. 165
Although cocaine may be injected, it is generally taken by
"snorting." The drug, a white crystalline powder, is placed in a
small spoon and inhaled through one nostril while the other is held
closed. Prolonged usage may cause bleeding from the nostrils. 166
The drug is not properly classified as a narcotic, in that it does not
depress the central nervous system;16 7 rather, it acts as a stimu-
lant.
Physiologically, cocaine causes an increase in pulse and res-
piratory rates, a rise in body temperature, and blood pressure,
constriction of the blood vessels, and dilation of the pupils.
During this state of hyperexcitement, the cocaine user often
becomes restless and talkative and experiences feelings of
increased sexual desire and greater physical and mental prow-
ess. He may find it difficult to measure time and distance.
Appetite, thirst, and fatigue are forgotten. 168
The effect is brief, lasting no more than an hour, and leaving the
user in a state of depression. Although not physically addicting,
prolonged use of cocaine may produce hallucinations, paranoia,
digestive disorders, nausea, insomnia, and malnutrition. 169
The routes by which cocaine enters the United States are
reasonably well known. Most cocaine is manufactured in Chile
and Cuba, with Chile being the largest single exporter of cocaine
to the United States. 170 Colombia, Panama, and Mexico are major
transshipment points.' 7 ' Most cocaine enters the United States
through Dade County, Florida, and is controlled by Cuban organ-
izations who carry it north to the New York metropolitan area. 172
A lesser amount is brought across the Mexican border. Once
inside the United States, it is distributed through regular channels.
165 N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1974, at 30, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1973, at 89, col. 5;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 21. 1973, at 74. col. 8.
166 NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27, 197 1, at 124.
167 Upton, Narcotics and Other Drugs Susceptible to Abuse, and their Regulation, l0
N.H.B.J. 264, 265 (1968). There is, however, a danger of psychological addiction.
McLaughlin: Cocaine, supra note 153, at 552.
16 8 McLaughlin: Cocaine, supra note 153, at 55 1.
169 Id. at 551-52.
170 N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1973, at 1l, col. 1. See also McLaughlin: Cocaine, supra note
153, at 547-49.
171 N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1973, at 89, col. 5. John Dean, when a counsellor to the
President, is reported to have indicated that the assassination of General Torrijos of
Panama was at one time under consideration as a means to curtail Panamanian govern-
mental involvement in illicit drug traffic. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1973, at 1, col. 8.172 id.
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International activity against cocaine has met with limited suc-
cess. Although there have been isolated achievements disrupting
the traditional smuggling networks, 173 almost no progress in limit-
ing coca growth in Peru and Bolivia has been made. The In-
ternational Narcotics Control Board in its 1972 Report described
the situation as follows:
The situation.., has undergone little marked change ... and
regrettably nothing has occurred to moderate international
concern which is felt in regard to the extensive coca bush
cultivation in the Andean region, especially in Bolivia and
Peru . . . . [C]oca leaf chewing is a traditional indulgence
which has been practiced for centuries in these regions and
because of its long continuance it would in any case be
difficult to eradicate; ... its elimination can hardly be looked
for in advance of major economic and social reforms ....
The debilitating . . . effects of . . . excessive coca leaf
chewing ... make it essential on humanitarian grounds alone
that organized cultivation of the coca bush should be termi-
nated as soon as possible. But this need acquires additional
sharpness and urgency from the fact that the present over-
production provides material for clandestine manufacture of
cocaine to supply the illicit traffic. This outflow has expanded
in recent times and present indications are that it will contin-
ue to grow in volume ....
... In Peru some measure of reform has been achieved in
recent years . . . . In Bolivia, so far as the Board is aware,
there has been none. 1 74
3. Psychotropic Substances.-There is no generally accepted
definition of the term "psychotropic substances." The proposed
Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1 75 lists in its schedules a
wide variety of drugs of both medical and nonmedical value.' 76 In
the street, they are the "chemicals," drugs of synthetic origin, and
their effects and composition vary as widely as the imaginations of
the chemists who produce them. They are the plague of in-
dustrialized states, the premier drugs of students, the middle class,
and the military. 1 77 They include the tranquilizers and stimulants
173 See notes 170 (Chile) and 97 (Panama) supra.
174 INCB REPORT, supra note 2, at 17-18.
171 See notes 283-3 13 and accompanying text infra.
176 The schedules include hallucinogenic substances such as LSD-25, mescaline, STP,
and psilocybine; a variety of amphetamines and barbiturates; and many more benign drugs
such as phenobarbitol.
177 SPONG, supra note 7, at 18.
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upon which much of society relies in order to cope with the
pressures of urban survival.
Those drugs having legitimate medical purposes may be readily
obtained from legitimate sources,178 and are consumed in fantastic
quantities.179 There is a flourishing black market in these drugs,
and they are quite inexpensive.180 The accessability of these
drugs, combined with the low profit margin, has retarded the
growth of large scale, organized trafficking in this area.
In small dosages, barbiturates may be used as tranquilizers,
sleeping pills, sedatives, and hypnotics. In larger quantities, or
combined with alcohol they may arrest the functioning of volun-
tary and involuntary muscles, inducing coma and death. Certain
barbiturates, if taken over a sufficiently prolonged period of time,
may be physically addicting.
That amphetamines have any legitimate medical use at all has
been seriously questioned. 8 1 When prescribed, they are intended
for use as antidepressants and as an aid in weight loss. When
consumed in large quantities, they induce a state of high ex-
citement, in which the user is able to do without food and rest for
days at a time, and during which he may be capable of functioning
at an abnormally high level of efficiency. Heartbeat and respira-
tion rate are increased. The user is inclined to be quite talkative
178 In most countries amphetamines and barbiturates may be prescribed by any
licensed physician. Although the United States requires special permits of physicians who
are authorized to dispense narcotics, no such permits are required for the dispensation of
barbiturates or amphetamines. Nor are the strict procedures required for record keeping in
the prescription of narcotics applicable to these drugs.
179 The following chart was compiled by the Narcotics Control Commission of the state
of New York, indicating the estimated number of individuals taking drugs at least six times
a month:
M inor tranquilizers (e.g., M iltown) .................................... 525,000
M arijuana ................................................................ 487,000
Barbiturates ............................................................. 381,000
D iet Pills (e.g., D exadrine) ............................................ 222,000
Sedatives, hypnotics (e.g., Doriden) .................................. 187,000
H eroin ................................................................... 157 ,000
Pep Pills ................................................................ 110 ,000
M ajor tranquilizers (e.g., Thorazine) .................................. 71,000
L S D ...................................................................... 45 ,000
A ntidepressants ........................................................ 39,000
"Speed" (M ethadrine) .................................................. 35,000
Controlled narcotics (e.g., morphine) ................................. 17,000
C ocaine .................................................................. 6 ,000
See 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 91.
180 In the United States it rarely costs more than one dollar to purchase most brands of
barbiturates on the street.
181 The New Jersey Water Pollution and Public Health Commission has called for an
outright ban on amphetamines, citing their extremely high potential for abuse, easy ac-
cessability, and limited medical value. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1973, at 74, col. 8.
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and may believe himself capable of feats of enormous physical,
mental, and sexual prowess. If taken continuously over a period
of days, the user may literally drive himself until he collapses.
Drugs for which no medical use has been found are of course
not produced by pharmaceutical firms; therefore, they must be
illicitly manufactured. They are produced in small laboratories
located in or near metropolitan areas.18 2 Although some skill is
required, a graduate chemist is capable of producing most of these
drugs at minimal cost. Most drugs so produced are properly
classified as hallucinogenics. Quite apart from dangers inherent in
the drugs themselves, there are other risks for the user. The drug
may have been improperly manufactured and may contain impu-
rities. More often, the drug may not be what it is said to be.
Because these drugs come in pill or liquid form, it is impossible
for the user to know what he is buying. Instances of strychnine
being sold as mescaline and animal tranquilizers being sold as
various drugs are quite common. The results of such sales are
often tragic.
The United States is the principal producer of all types of
psychotropic substances.'l 3 Although most hallucinogenics pro-
duced in the United States are consumed domestically, there is a
sizeable export of hallucinogenics to Western Europe, where bar-
biturates and LSD are the drugs of choice.' 8 4 In addition, there
are fears that exports of amphetamines and barbiturates to devel-
oping countries, where new markets may be found for illicit drug
use in the urban areas, are increasing.' 8 5
II. THE DRUG CONTROL CONVENTIONS
The need for international cooperation in coming to grips with
illicit drug traffic has long been recognized.'8 6 Beginning with the
Shanghai Opium Conference in 1909, the international commu-
nity has repeatedly attempted to devise some sort of regime that
would be capable of inducing the members of the international
community to coordinate their efforts in controlling drug traffic
while retaining sufficient flexibility to enable the large majority of
182 Id. (referring to the spread of illicit chemists in New Jersey and Philadelphia).
183 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 8 1.
184 SPONG, supra note 7, at 18.
1'1 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 8 1.
1 86 E.g., DOWLES, THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1966) [here-
inafter cited as GENESIS].
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states to adhere to it.187 The most recent and most successful
attempt is the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,188
which went into effect December 13, 1964, and has been ratified
by 104 nations. 189
A. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
The Single Convention replaces all previous treaties in this
field. 190 It centralizes the international narcotics control machin-
ery and places the cultivation and harvesting of plants used in the
production of marijuana, cocaine, and opium under international
regulations. Signatory states are required to establish criminal
penalties for violation of the control provisions set forth in the
treaty, and provision is made for extradition.
Primary responsibility for the administration of the terms of the
Single Convention is vested in two bodies-the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council, and the
International Narcotics Control Board. 191 The Commission has
the authority to "consider all matters pertaining to the aims" 19 2 of
the Single Convention, including the right to modify the schedules
of controlled drugs, 193 to make recommendations furthering the
aims of the Convention, to call the attention of the Board to
matters relevant to its functions, and to approach nonparties to
the Convention in order to encourage their compliance with its
terms. 194
It has the duty to assist the Economic and Social Council in
exercising general supervision over drug treaties, to advise the
Council on all matters relating to narcotics, to prepare draft con-
187 Agreements were promulgated by a group of nations under the general leadership of
the United States in 1912; under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1925, 1931 (two
agreements), and 1936; and under United Nations auspices in 1946, 1948, 1953, 1961,
1971, and 1972. For a brief discussion of treaties predating the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, see Bassiouni, The International Narcotics Control System: A
Proposal, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713 (1972), at 722-27.
188 U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 34/22 (1961); SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS,
1961; 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter cited as SINGLE
CONVENTION].
189 As of March 31, 1974.
190 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 44.
191 Id., art. 5. Other bodies and organs involved in the control regime include the
Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly, the Secretary General, and the
World Health Organization. Ultimate responsibility for the Convention's success or failure
is given to the Parties themselves.
192 Id., art. 8.
193 Id., art. 3. See also notes 226-234 and accompanying text infra.
194 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 8.
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ventions as necessary, and to consider what changes may be
needed in existing machinery for the control of narcotics. 195
It may also discuss problems involving substances not included
in the Single Convention. In line with this right, the Commission
adopted the Draft Protocol on Psychotropic Substances. 196 It
receives reports from the International Narcotics Control
Board, 197 requires parties to the Convention to furnish such in-
formation to the Secretary General as may be necessary for the
performance of its functions, and specifies the dates by which
such information must be supplied. 198 The Commission prescribes
the form which import certificates to be used by the parties are to
take, 199 and recommends safeguards to be adopted by countries of
registry of ships or aircraft to prevent diversion of drugs carried
by such vessels for emergency or first-aid purposes. 200
The International Narcotics Control Board is elected by the
Economic and Social Council. 20' Three of its eleven members are
elected from a list provided by the World Health Organization;
eight are chosen from a list provided by the Member Nations of
the United Nations and of the Single Convention.20 2 Members are
elected for a term of office of three years and may be
re-elected. 203 To the Board, the successor to the Permanent Cen-
tral Board, and to the Drug Supervisory Body, falls the task of
administering the Single Convention's estimate system, a task
which the authors of the Single Convention felt would require at
least two annual sessions. 20 4
The estimate system is intended to limit the quantities of nar-
195 SECRETARY GENERAL, COMMENTARY ON THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTICS
DRUGS, 1961, United Nations, New York (1973), at 125 [hereinafter cited as COM-
MENTARY].
196 Id. at 126.
197 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 15, para. I.
198 Id., art. 18.
199 Id., art. 3 1, para. 5.
200 Id., art. 32, para. 2.
201 Id., art. 9.
202 Id., art. 9, para. I.
The right of non-parties to the Single Convention to nominate candidates for
membership on the Board appears to be justified on the ground that they
contribute to the budget of the United Nations and thus to the cost of
maintaining the Board.
COMMENTARY, supra note 195, at 133.
203 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 10, para. I.
204/d., art. 11, para. 2.
The inclusion in the Single Convention of the mandatory requirement of two
annual sessions should relieve the . . . Board of the annual burden of
justifying ... the necessity of two sessions.
COMMENTARY, supra note 195, at 15 1.
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cotics which countries may obtain or produce to the amount
needed for medical and scientific purposes.20 5 In a sense, it is the
heart of the Convention. Every year, each party must furnish to
the Board estimates of the quantities of drugs that it will consume
for medical and scientific purposes, the quantity of drugs to be
used in making other drugs or preparations, the quantity of drugs
to remain in stock at the end of the year, and the quantity of drugs
necessary for addition to special stocks.20 6 Parties are to inform
the Board of the method used in determining the estimates. The
Board sets the date by which these estimates shall be furnished,20 7
although parties have the right to furnish supplemental esti-
mates.20 8 If a state fails to furnish estimates, the Board is to
establish its own estimates for that state.209 The Board may re-
quire that parties furnish additional information. After receiving
all such information, the Board must either confirm the estimates
or, with the consent of the state concerned, amend them. 2 1 0
No state may exceed its estimated drug requirements. 211 If the
Board finds that a country has manufactured or imported a greater
quantity of a particular drug than it had estimated it would require
for that year, the estimate for the next year is to be reduced by the
amount of the excess.212 Similarly, drugs released from special
stocks for civilian use and illicit drugs seized and released for
legitimate use are to be deducted from the next year's estimate. 213
If the total amount of a particular drug exported to a country in a
given year exceeds that country's estimated requirement, the
Board may notify other parties, who are then obligated not to
205 The estimate system is provided for in articles 12, 19, and 21 of the Single Con-
vention, and in article 3 1, paragraph I(b). The supplemental statistics system is found in
articles 13 and 20.
206 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 19, para. 1. Note that "for the purposes
of this Convention a drug shall be regarded as 'consumed' when it has been supplied for
retail distribution." Art. 1, para. 2. "Special stocks" refers to drugs required by the armed
forces and those necessitated in order to cope with major disasters. See COMMENTARY,
supra note 195, at 232.
207 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 12, para. 1. It has set August 1 of the
year preceding that year to which the estimates refer as the date for all estimates to have
been received by the Board. COMMENTARY, supra note 190, at 155-56.
208 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 19, para. 3.
209 Id., art. 12, para. 3. This applies to all nations whether or not they are parties to the
Single Convention. Accordingly, the Board is empowered to request estimates from
governments of countries not party to the Convention.
210 Id., art. 12 paras. 4, 5.
211 Id., art. 19, para.5.
212 Id., art 21, para. 3.
213 Id., art. 21, para. 2.
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authorize further exports of that drug to that country for that
year.2 14
In addition to the estimates, the parties are required to furnish
to the Board statistical information with respect to the production
or manufacture of drugs, the use of drugs in the manufacture of
other drugs or preparations, the consumption of drugs, the im-
ports and exports of drugs and poppy straw, the seizure and
disposal of illicit drugs, and the stocks of drugs on hand at the end
of the year to which the statistics refer.215 This information must
be supplied annually, and is to be furnished to the Board by June
30 of the year following the year to which it refers, except that
quarterly reports are to be made of drug imports and exports. 216
Parties may, but are not required to furnish information regarding
the amount of land used in the growing of opium poppies. 217 Nor
are they required to reveal information about special stocks, but
must furnish information concerning drugs imported for special
purposes or released from special stocks for general use.218
The Board specifies the form in which these returns are to be
furnished, and examines them "with a view to determining wheth-
er a Party or other State has complied with the provisions of this
Convention." 219 The Board must determine whether the statistics
are complete and whether they are accurate. This may be done by
a process of comparing interdependent data.
The Board may use facts from different sources in evaluating
the accuracy and completeness of statistical returns. It may
compare the import statistics of a particular country or terri-
tory with the export statistics of the countries of origin, or the
export statistics in one return with the import statistics of the
countries and territories of destination. It may study the re-
turns in the light of information ... from the annual reports
on the workings of the Single Convention and from the re-
ports on seizures of drugs. . . .from other communications
furnished by Governments .. . to other intergovernmental
organizations or organs, or from official data released by
Governments to the public. Information from private sources
... may not be used. 220
214 Id., art. 21, para. 4.
215 Id., art. 20, para. I.
216 Id., art. 20, para. 2. Note that while the Board fixes the date for the receipt of
estimates, the date for receipt of statistics is fixed by the Convention itself.
217 Id., art. 20, para. 3.
218 Id., art. 20, para. 4.
219 Id., art. 13, paras. 1,2.
220 COMMENTARY, supra note 195. at 173-74. See also SINGLE CONVENTION, sUpra
note 188, art. 14, para. 1.
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If the information is not complete or accurate, the Board may
require additional information.22 This information may be used
not only to see whether a party has exceeded its estimates but
also to evaluate its overall progress against illicit drugs. If the
Board has reason to believe that the aims of the Convention are
being threatened by the failure of a state to fulfill its obligations, it
may ask for an explanation from the government of that state, and
may call upon the state to take measures to correct the situ-
ation. 222 If these measures fail, the Board may call the matter to
the attention of the other parties, the Commission, and the Eco-
nomic and Social Council 223 and may recommend to the parties
that they cease the import and export of drugs to the country in
question.224
The measures of control required by the Single Convention
with respect to the drugs, preparations, and plants to which it is
applicable vary according to two factors: the value of the sub-
stance for medical or scientific purposes and its potential for
abuse. Each drug is classified into one of four schedules. 22 5
All drugs are classified in either Schedule I or Schedule II, with
the most dangerous of the Schedule I drugs listed under Schedule
IV as well. Drugs listed in Schedule I are subject to all restric-
tions and controls included in the Convention except those appli-
cable to specific substances. With respect to Schedule IV drugs,
parties may adopt additional measures beyond those specified in
the Single Convention, and may prohibit their production, trade,
or use.2 26 Schedule II drugs are subject to the same controls as
are those in Schedule I except that they are exempt from certain
restrictions at the retail level. They may be accumulated at retail
distribution centers; medical prescriptions need not be required
for their dispensation; and the exact drug content need not be
221 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 13, para. 3.
222 Id., art. 14, para. I(a). (b). Note that this sanction is not confined to a failure of a state
to keep production and imports within estimates, but may include other matters as well.
This is a very delicate area, because it may lead to the recommendation of an embargo on
the import, export, or both, of drugs to a state. Consideration is, accordingly, given to the
political reality of the situation. The failure to comply must seriously endanger the aims of
the Convention. Actions of the Board are to be kept confidential until it is necessary to
inform the other parties of the situation, in order to avoid embarrassment and offense to
the state in question. It is also noteworthy that the Single Convention does not authorize
the Board to impose a mandatory embargo, as was permitted under the 1953 Opium
Protocol, but merely to recommend to the parties that they do so. No embargo has ever
been recommended by the Board under the authority of the Single Convention.
223 Id., art. 14, para. l(c).
224 Id., art. 14, para. 2.
2251d., art. 2. Note that Schedule IV drugs are also listed in Schedule I.
226 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 2, para. 5.
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shown on the label. 227 Additional controls are applicable to
opium, coca leaf, and cannabis, and special provision is made for
the control of poppy, poppy straw, cannabis plant and leaves, and
the coca bush.
The control provisions applicable to drugs in Schedule I
constitute the standard regime under the Single Convention.
The principal features of this regime are: limitation to medical
and scientific purposes of all phases of the narcotics trade
(manufacture, domestic trade, both wholesale and retail, and
international trade) in, and of the possession and use of,
drugs; requirement of governmental authorization (licensing
or state ownership) of participation in any phase of the narcot-
ics trade, and of a specific authorization (import and export
authorizations) of each individual international transaction;
obligation of all participants in the narcotics trade to keep
detailed records of their transactions in drugs, requirement of
a medical prescription for the supply or dispensation of drugs
to individuals; and a system of limiting the quantities of drugs
available, by manufacture or import or both, in each country
and territory, to those needed for medical and scientific pur-
poses.2 28
Drugs are rarely used in their pure, unadulterated form. Rather,
they are almost always combined with other substances to form
mixtures, or "preparations. 2 29 Preparations are regulated ac-
cording to the regime prescribed for the schedule in which the
drug they contain is listed.2 30 Since the Board does not keep
records of preparations as such, but only of their drug content,
parties are not required to furnish specific information on prepara-
tions to the Board. Similarly, since permits are required for the
production of drugs, there is no need to require special permits for
the manufacture of preparations as well.
Schedule III substances comprise a class of preparations of
227 Id., art. 30. paras. 2, 5.6.
228 COMMENTARY, supra note 195, at 5 1-52. See SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188,
art. 4, para. c, the general provision limiting drugs to medical and scientific use; art. 29,
controlling the manufacture of drugs, compelling licensing and permits; art. 30, regulating
domestic trade, requiring licensing for trade and distribution of drugs, preventing accumu-
lation of drugs, and setting out labelling requirements; art. 31, governing international
trade, requiring stringent import/export controls and a separate license for each transac-
tion; art. 34, governing licensure and requiring records keeping at all levels of drug
manufacture and consumption; and article 37, providing for seizure of illicit drugs and
equipment used in illicit trafficking. See also notes 205-24 and accompanying text, supra,
for a description of the method of preventing overproduction.
229 A preparation is defined as "a mixture, solid or liquid, containing a drug." Id., art. I.
para. s.
230 Id., art. 2, para. 3. If a preparation contains drugs of more than one Schedule, the
most rigorous regime applicable is to be implemented.
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significant medical value and small potential for abuse. Controls
on this class of preparations are, accordingly, somewhat re-
laxed.231 Government authorization is not required for the import
or export of these substances. Estimates and statistics with re-
spect to the quantity of drugs consumed in the manufacture of
these preparations must be furnished to the Board, but no other
information is required. Apart from this, Schedule III prepara-
tions are subject to the same controls as are those falling under
Schedule II.
Opium, coca leaf, and cannabis are listed in both Schedules I
and IV, and are subject to additional controls as well. If a party
permits the cultivation of the opium poppy for the production of
opium, or the coca bush, or cannabis plant for any purpose, it
must establish a government agency to oversee the production
and harvest of the crop.232 A licensing system for private in-
dividuals is not satisfactory, in that it would not be possible to
establish with accuracy the quantity of the crop being grown and
therefore would be far more difficult to prevent the sale of the
crop to illicit buyers. "In fact, experience has shown that per-
mitting licensed private traders to purchase the crops results in
diversion of large quantities of drugs into illicit channels." 233
The agency must designate the areas in which these crops may
be planted, license those authorized to plant them, and specify the
extent of the land on which cultivation is to be permitted. The
growers are required to sell their entire crop to the agency, which
must take physical possession of the crop as soon as possible after
the harvest. With certain medical exceptions, the agency is to
have exclusive trading rights in the harvested crop as well as the
exclusive right to maintain stocks in it.234
Unlike the 1953 Opium Protocol, the Single Convention does
not limit the number of states which are permitted to grow
opium. 2 35 Rather the aim of the Single Convention is to guard
overproduction and to make certain that all opium exported is
subject to international controls. Before initiating or increasing the
size of an opium crop, a party must satisfy itself that such action
will not result in illicit traffic or overproduction. 236 If a party
which did not export opium during the ten years prior to January
231 Id., art. 2, para. 4.
232 Id., art. 23 (opium), art. 26 (coca bush), and art. 28 (cannabis).
233 COMMENTARY, supra note 195, at 278.
234 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 23, para. 2.
235 The 1953 Opium Protocol limited opium production to the nations of Bulgaria,
Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia.
236 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 24, para. 1.
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1, 1961, desires to do so, it must notify the Board, which may
either approve the notification or recommend to the party that it
not export opium. 237 Parties which produced and exported opium
during the ten years prior to January 1, 1961, may continue to do
so. 238 Only opium exported with approval of the Board, or by
parties which had previously done so, may be imported by a party
to the Convention. 239 This does not, however, prevent a party
from producing opium for its own requirements or from exporting
illicit opium which has been seized. 240
The poppy, the coca bush, and the cannabis plant all have
legitimate nonmedicinal uses. The poppy is widely grown for its
oil and seeds, coca for use as a flavoring agent, and cannabis for
use as hemp. The Single Convention recognizes these legitimate
uses, and sets forth measures to insure that plants grown for them
are not diverted for the production of illicit drugs. Accordingly,
parties growing poppies for purposes other than the production of
opium must take measures to prevent their use for opium and
must subject the poppy straw to the same import and export
restrictions applied to Schedule I drugs. 241 Coca leaves may be
used for flavoring agents only after all alkaloids have been remov-
ed. 242 Wild coca bushes are to be destroyed. 243 Paries are to adopt
"such measures as may be necessary" to prevent illicit traffic in
cannabis leaves.2 44 Estimates and statistics on the use of coca
leaves for flavoring and statistics on the import and export of
poppy straw must be provided to the Board. 245 If a party comes to
the conclusion that it cannot otherwise prevent the diversion of
drugs produced from opium, cannabis, or coca grown in its terri-
tory into the illicit drug traffic, it is to prohibit the cultivation of
these plants. 246
Although it is recognized that coordination among national po-
237 Id., art. 24, para. 2.
238 Id., art. 24, para. 3. "During" is defined as "at any point in", rather than as
"throughout". See COMMENTARY, supra note 195, at 293.
239 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 24, para. 4.
240 Id., art. 24, para. 5.
241 Id., art. 25. "Poppy straw" is defined as "all parts (except the seeds) of the opium
poppy, after mowing." Id., art. 1, para. 1(r). Raw opium may, through a mechanical
process requiring some sophistication, be extracted from poppy straw.
242 Id., art. 27, para. I.
243 Id., art. 26, para. 2.
244 Id., art. 28, para. 3.
245 Id., art. 27, para. 2 (coca leaves) and art. 25, para. 3 (poppy straw).
246 Id., art. 22. This article has given rise to the position that 'flurkey, being unable
through other means to prevent the diversion of part of its opium crop into illicit channels,
is obligated to prohibit all cultivation. See, e.g., 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 58, 109.
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lice forces is essential to any international regime for the suppres-
sion of illicit drug traffic, the mechanics of establishing a system of
international police cooperation present a difficult problem. If an
agreement requires that major adjustments be made in national
police and judicial systems, many states may be unwilling or
unable to adhere to it.247 The Single Convention provides for a
very flexible system of cooperation. Phrased in general terms, the
Convention calls upon the parties to make arrangements for the
coordination of national antinarcotics efforts; to provide assis-
tance and cooperation to other nations and with international
organizations, and to ensure that legal papers necessary for the
prosecution of an offender in another country are provided ex-
peditiously.2 48
Subject to their constitutional limitations, parties to the Single
Convention are required to enact laws and regulations making all
forms of drug trafficking in violation of the terms of the Con-
vention punishable offenses and to provide for serious violations
"adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other pen-
alties of deprivation of liberty. '249
The Convention provides that each element involved in the
illicit cultivation, manufacture, possession, distribution, and sale
of drugs shall, if committed in more than one country, be deemed
a specific offense. 250 Moreover, conspiracy and attempts to com-
mit any of these specific offenses are themselves punishable
offenses, as are "preparatory acts and financial operations in
connection" with any of the offenses. 251 The intent of these provi-
sions is to establish national jurisdiction according to the territo-
rial principle as broadly as possible, and thus to develop a
network whereby every participant involved at any point in what
might otherwise be regarded as a single crime might be prosecuted
for his role. Offenders are to be prosecuted by the country in
which the offense was committed or "if extradition is not accept-
247 This is why the 1939 Convention received such a poor reception, and failed to attain
any measure of general applicability. See COMMENTARY, supra note 195, at 415-16;
Bassiouni, supra note 187, at 724-25.
248 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 35.
249 Id., art. 36, para. I.
250 Id., art. 36, para. 2(a) ( (i) ). The offenses are enumerated in article 36, paragraph I.
They are:
cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession,
offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms
whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation
and exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention....
25 Id., art. 36, para. 2(a)((ii)).
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able in conformity with the law of the Party to which application
is made," by the country in which the offender is apprehended.2 52
Foreign convictions are to be considered as evidence of recidiv-
ism.253
Extradition is not mandatory under the Convention, although it
is recommended that parties include narcotics offenses in existing
extradition treaties or grant it on the basis of reciprocity.254 Par-
ties have the right to refuse to extradite offenders, if they do not
regard the offense as sufficiently serious to warrant it. Any drugs
or equipment used in committing narcotics offenses may be con-
fiscated.2 55 To the extent possible, parties are to provide adequate
facilities for the care and rehabilitation of drug addicts. 256
B. Weaknesses in the Single Convention
The Single Convention is the most important, most influential
multilateral treaty ever adopted in the field of international narcot-
ics control. As such, it represents a major accomplishment in the
development of a coordinated approach to the problems of illicit
drug traffic. Nonetheless, it has several significant weaknesses. 2 57
It relies almost entirely on the voluntary cooperation of the par-
ties and has no realistic enforcement mechanism. There is no
precise control over the amount of opium grown, and only indirect
control to prevent overproduction. By its very nature, the esti-
mate system is incapable of revealing yearly overproduction until
several months have passed; reporting delays can extend this
period indefinitely. By the time the Board is in a position to act,
the drugs may have already been filtered into illicit channels. The
authority of the Board is restricted primarily to that of making
recommendations and giving advice, and it may obtain its in-
formation only from governmental sources.
There are two more basic deficiencies. First, it does not deal at
all with psychotropic substances, which are, at this time, regulated
by no multilateral treaty. Secondly, its emphasis is almost ex-
clusively on the prevention of diversion of drugs from legitimate
212 Id., art. 36, para. 2(a)((iv)).
253 Id., art. 36, para. 2(a)((iii)).
254 Id., art. 36. para. 2(b).
255 Id., art. 37.
256 Id., art. 38.
257 See generally 6 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 624, 626-27 (1973); Bassiouni, supra
note 187, at 731.
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sources, and gives little consideration to the suppression of illicit
traffic itself. It devotes but a single article to measures of in-
ternational police cooperation, and its terms are neither specific
nor binding. No provision is made for extra-territorial jurisdiction
or international enforcement machinery; extradition is not man-
datory. There is nothing to compel the sort of cooperation that is
necessary if the long established drug networks are to be dis-
rupted.
A multilateral treaty is by definition a common denominator;
the minimum acceptable to the greatest number of states. It fails,
unlike bilateral treaties, in which there is a greater affinity of
interest, to take the vigorous measures needed for progress in
these areas.2 58 Nonetheless, at the initiative of the United States,
a Conference was held in March, 1972, to consider amendments
to the Single Convention to remedy these weaknesses. 259 The
result of this conference is the proposed Protocol Amending the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 196 1.260
C. The Protocol to the Single Convention
The Protocol, which was adopted by a vote of 71 to 0,261 with
258 See notes 77-82 and note 102 supra and accompanying text.
259 Report accompanying Hearings on Executive J, supra note 100, at 2. See also 6
VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 624 (1973).
260 U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 63/9 (25 March 1972); Executive J. 92d Cong. 2d Sess.; 118
CONG. REC. 14, 853 (daily ed. Sept. 14. 1972). [Hereinafter referred to as Protocol]. The
Protocol will take effect thirty days after it has been ratified by forty nations. As of March
31, 1974, 29 nations had done so. They are: Australia, Panama, Sweden, the United
States, Finland, The Republic of Korea, Haiti, Kenya, Costa Rica, Brazil, Ivory Coast,
Jordan, Paraguay, Ecuador, Tonga, Japan, Malawi, Dahomey, Kuwait, Fiji, Norway,
Argentina, Cyprus, Niger, Rumania, Egypt, Israel, Syria, and Senegal.
261 Voting in favor were Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands,
Nicaragua. Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Republic of Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa,
,Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States, Venezuela, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey,
Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, and
Luxembourg. Abstaining were Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Ukranian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.,
Algeria, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
Dr. Babaian, the delegate from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, speaking in
explanation of his vote, indicated that it was inapproriate that some of the Protocol's
provisions extended to states which were not parties to the Single Convention; and that his
delegation was opposed to "the granting of extensive powers to the Board which would
make it a virtually supra-national body and were inconsistent with the sovereignty of
states."
These sentiments were also expressed by delegates from Poland, the Ukranian S.S.R.,
and Bulgaria.
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12 abstentions, dramatically increases the power of the Board and
the scope of the Single Convention. 262 The size of the Board is
increased from eleven to thirteen, in order to achieve a better
geographic representation. 263 The terms of office of individual
members are extended from three to five years and staggered. 264
The Board is explicitly given the function of endeavoring to limit
the cultivation and use of drugs to medical and scientific purposes
and to prevent their illicit use. 265
The scope of the information required by the estimate system is
broadened. In addition to the information required under the
Single Convention, parties to the Protocol are required to furnish
estimates of the area and location of land to be used for the
cultivation of the opium poppy, the amount of opium to be pro-
duced, the number of industrial establishments which will manu-
facture synthetic drugs, and the quantities of synthetic drugs to be
produced by each establishment. 26 6 Statistics on the ascertainable
area of cultivation of the opium poppy must also be provided. 26 7
In the event that the Board disagrees with the estimates furnished
to it, it has the right to establish its own estimates. 268 If the Board
finds that a party to the Protocol has not limited opium production
to its estimated production, and that a significant amount of this
opium has entered the illicit traffic, it may deduct all or part of this
amount from the amount to be produced in the next year in which
such a deduction is technically possible. 269 If the party fails to
cooperate with the Board's decision, the Board may avail itself of
the enforcement procedures provided in the Single Convention.270
In addition to information obtained from governments, the
Board is authorized to receive data from specialized agencies of
---The delegate from Burma said that while his delegation approved of the broad prin-
ciples of the Protocol, the special circumstances in his country were such that difficulties
would arise if outside authorities could impose acts upon his country.
No explanations were given by the delegates from Panama or Algeria.
See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER AMENDMENTS TO THE SINGLE
CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961 (Geneva 6-24 March 1972) Official Records,
Vol. 2; U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 63/10/Add. 1, at 61-68 [hereinafter cited as PROTOCOL
CONFERENCE]. Of those nations abstaining, thus far only Panama has ratified the Protocol.
262 See generally note 259 supra.
263 Protocol, supra note 260, art. 2, amending art. 9, para. I of the Single Convention.
264 Id., art. 20, para. 3, amending Single Convention art. 10, para. 1.
265 Id., art. 2, amending Single Convention art. 9, adding a new paragraph. The Single
Convention assigns these functions to the parties themselves.
266 Id., art. 9, amending Single Convention art. 19, adding new paragraphs l(e), (f), (g),
and (h).
267 Id., art. 10, amending Single Convention art. 20, adding new paragraph 1 (g).
268 Id., art. 5, amending Single Convention art. 12, para. 5.
269 Id., art. 1I, adding new art. 21 bis; art. 21 bis, para. 2. Note that this substantially
offsets the effect of delays in reporting information to the Board.
270 Id., art. 21 bis, para. 4. Cf. SINGLE CONVENTION supra note 188, art. 14.
FALL 1974]
Journal of Law Reform
the United Nations, intergovernmental organizations, and inter-
national nongovernmental organizations which have direct com-
petence in the subject matter and are in consultative status with
the Economic and Social Council.271 If the Board, on the basis of
this information, feels that the aims of the Convention are being
seriously endangered by the failure of any country to meet its
obligations under the Convention or if there is evidence that a
country may become an important center of cultivation, manufac-
ture, traffic, or consumption of drugs, it may propose the opening
of confidential consultations between that country and the
Board. 272 In addition the Board may request that a study be
conducted within the territory of the country in question. 273 If the
aims of the Convention are being seriously threatened and it has
not been possible to remedy the problem in any other way, or if
there is a serious situation requiring cooperative action, the Board
must bring the matter to the attention of the parties, the Commis-
sion, and the Economic and Social Council, which may in turn
bring the matter before the General Assembly. 274 Although it was
proposed that the Board have the right to impose an embargo on
the import and export of drugs into any country in danger of
becoming a center of illicit traffic, this proposal was defeated.27 5
and, as in the Single Convention, the Board may do no more than
recommend such an embargo. The Board is given the specific
authority to recommend to the appropriate United Nations organs
that technical and financial assistance be provided to the country
concerned in order to further its efforts to fulfill the provisions of
the Convention.276
271 Id., art. 6, amending Single Convention art. 14, para. 1(a).
272 Id.
273 Id., art. 6, amending Single Convention art. 14, adding new para. 1(c).
274 Id., art. 6, amending Single Convention art. 14, para. I(d).
275 6 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L., supra note 257, at 628-29. It does not appear that
the United States seriously pressed this point in discussions at the Conference. See
PROTOCOL CONFERENCE, supra note 261, at 71-8 1, and generally.
276 Protocol, supra note 260, art. 7, amending Single Convention, adding new article 14
bis.
One such method is the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. Established in
April, 1971, to provide emergency assistance to states in developing programs against drug
abuse, the Fund is directed against the problems of demand, illicit production, and illicit
traffic. The Fund, which is supported entirely by voluntary subscriptions, provides the
United Nations with the means to respond directly to requests for aid from countries with
drug abuse problems. To date funding has been rather inadequate. The United States,
having contributed between $5 million and $6 million, is the leading subscriber; most other
states have contributed only token amounts. Notwithstanding its limited resources. the
Fund has achieved some measure of respectability as an efficient and valued orga-
nization and is expected to become increasingly significant as time passes and the level of
subscriptions increases. See "U.S. Supports U.N. Program Against Drug Abuse," supra
note 70, at 126-27; INCB REPORT, supra note 2, at 29; 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at
71-72, 120.
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Cooperative and penal provisions are also strengthened. Parties
are encouraged to furnish the Board and the Commission in-
formation relating to illicit drug activities within their borders, and
the Board is authorized to provide assistance to parties in furnish-
ing this information and in helping to curtail such activity. 277
Narcotics offenses are to be included as extraditable offenses in
all extradition treaties between parties. If there are no such
treaties, parties may consider the Protocol as such a treaty.278
However, the escape clause is preserved; parties retain the right
to refuse to grant extradition where they feel the offense is not
sufficiently serious to merit it.279 Treatment and rehabilitation
may be provided either in addition to or instead of punishment.280
Parties to the Protocol undertake to give special attention to
training personnel, to providing facilities for this purpose, and to
educating the public to the problems of drug abuse. 281 Finally,
regional agreements for scientific research and education are en-
couraged; the Board is authorized to provide technical assistance
in their establishment. 2 2
D. The Convention on Psychotropic Substances
Although the Protocol remedies many of the weaknesses of the
Single Convention, it does not incorporate any control over drugs
not included in the Convention itself. Specifically, it does not
approach the problems of regulating psychotropic substances. A
regime for their control is to be found in the proposed Convention
on Psychotropic Substances. 2 3 Although there are a number of
modifications, it is basically quite similar to the Single Con-
vention, and contains many of the same defects. As in the Single
Convention, primary responsibility for administration of the
agreement rests with the parties themselves, assisted by the
277 Protocol, supra note 260, art. 13, amending Single Convention art. 35, adding new
para. f and g.
278 Id., art. 14, amending Single Convention art. 36, para. 2(b).
279 Id.
280 Id., art. 14, amending Single Convention art. 36, adding new para. I(b). Note that the
Single Convention calls for punishment "particularly by imprisonment".
281 id., art. 15. amending Single Convention art. 38.
282 Id., art. 16, amending Single Convention art. 38 his.
283 U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 58/6 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as Psychotropic Convention]. The
Convention comes into effect ninety days after the fortieth nation ratifies it. As of March
31. 1974, only seventeen had done so: Bulgaria, Chile, Egypt, Finland, Paraguay, Panama,
South Africa, Sweden, Venezuela, Brazil, Mauritius, Spain, Ecuador, Yugoslavia, Nica-
ragua, Dahomey, and Cyprus. None of the major producers of psychotropic substances
have done so. Although the United States had signed the Convention. the Senate has yet
to ratify it.
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Board. The responsibility for the classification of drugs is given to
the Commission and the World Health Organization (WHO).
Four schedules are established, and substances are classified ac-
cording to
the extent or likelihood of abuse, the degree of seriousness of
the public health and social problems and the degree of use-
fulness of the substance in medical therapy....
Any party or the WHO may request that a substance not clas-
sified as a psychotropic substance be so classified or that a sub-
stance be transferred from one schedule to another. 28 5 The World
Health Organization must examine the substance. If it finds that
the substance has the capacity to produce a state of dependence
and an effect on the central nervous system, or that it resembles a
substance previously placed in one of the schedules, and that the
substance is likely to be abused, the WHO is to communicate its
findings to the Commission 28 6 for a final decision. 28 7 The decision
of the Commission takes effect 180 days after the parties are
notified of it.28
As in the Single Convention, the basic regime is directed at
regulating the most dangerous (Schedule I) substances. As drugs
are classified as progressively less dangerous, the controls appli-
cable to them are progressively relaxed.28 9 Schedule I sub-
stances 290 are to be prohibited except for limited medical pur-
poses, and are to be carefully regulated and supervised at every
point. Special licenses are required for manufacture, trade, dis-
tribution, and possession. Specific records are to be kept. Import
and export of Schedule I substances are prohibited except under
special authorization.2 91
The Convention on Psychotropic Substances does not require
284 Id., art. 2, para. 4.
285 Id., art. 2, para. 1.
286 Id., art. 2, para. 4.
287 Id., art. 2, para. 5.
288 Id., art. 2, para. 7. Cf. SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 3, para. 7,
providing that the decision of the Commission becomes effective immediately upon notifi-
cation of the parties. Note also that the Convention on Psychotropic Substances permits a
party to exempt itself from the effects of a Commission decision adding a substance to the
Schedules, except that it must still take certain minimum precautions. Id., art. 2, para. 7.
289 Id., art. 5. Unlike the Single Convention, Schedule IV of the Psychotropic Sub-
stances Convention comprises those drugs thought to be least dangerous rather than those
thought to be most dangerous.
290 Substances so classified include LSD, LSD-25, mescaline, psilocybine, DET,
DMHP, DMT, parahexyl, psilocine, psilotsin, STP, DOM, and the tetrahydrocannabinols
(THC).
291 Psychotropic Convention, supra note 283, art. 7.
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parties to make unauthorized possession of Schedule II, 1II, or
IV substances illegal, although it notes that it is "desirable" that
they do so. 29 2 For these substances, the basic elements of the
control regime include licensing for trade, manufacture, and dis-
tribution;293 dispensation by medical prescription only ;2 4 detailed
record keeping by manufacturers, traders, and distributors; 295 re-
striction of international trade in Schedule I and Schedule II
substances to those specifically authorized for each separate
transaction; 296 and restrictions on methods of shipping and stor-
age of substances in international trade. 297 Parties retain a large
measure of discretion in determining how to implement these
provisions.
No provision limiting the manufacture of drugs, such as that
found in the Single Convention, is included in the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. However, if a party decides to prohibit
the import of psychotropic substances into its territory, other
parties are bound to prohibit the export of such substances to that
country in the absence of special authorization. 298 Preparations
are regulated according to the substance which they contain and
may be exempted from certain control measures if found not to
present a risk of abuse. 299 Parties are advised, but not required, to
establish a special administration to oversee the application of the
Convention in their countries.300
Although there is no estimate system, parties are required to
furnish certain information to the Secretary General, including
changes in domestic laws and regulations concerning psychotropic
substances and developments in the abuse of and illicit traffic in
these substances.301 In addition, parties are required to furnish to
the Board statistical information with respect -to the quantities of
Schedule I and II substances manufactured, imported, or export-
ed; the quantities of Schedule II and III substances used in the
292 Id., art. 5, para. 3.
293 Id., art. 8.
294 Id., art. 9.
295 Id., art. II. Records of retail distribution must be kept of Schedule II substances,
and parties are required to have access to information regarding retail activity in Schedule
III substances as well.
296 Id., art. 12.
297 Id., art. 12, art. 14.
298 Id., art. 13.
299 Id., art. 13.
300 Id., art. 6. Cf. SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 17, in which this is made
mandatory.
301 Id., art. 16, para. 1.
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manufacture of preparations; and the quantities of substances
used for industrial purposes. 30 2
The enforcement provisions of the Convention on Psychotropic
Substances are substantially identical to those of the Single Con-
vention.A03 As in the Single Convention, the Board, which is
charged with the duty of enforcement, is restricted to information
obtained from governments and United Nations organs? 0 4 The
Board may ask for explanations, request that remedial measures
be adopted, call the matter of a recalcitrant party to the attention
of the other parties to the Convention, and ultimately recommend
an embargo on the import and export of psychotropic substances
to and from the country concerned.30 5
Although the provisions for joint action against illicit traffic30 6
and the penal provisions 30 7 are very similar to those provided for
in the Single Convention,308 there are two significant distinctions.
The Convention on Psychotropic Substances explicitly states that
the sharing of information on illicit traffic is a duty of the par-
ties,309 while the Single Convention does not. The Convention on
Psychotropic Substances provides for the possibility of treatment
as an alternative to punishment for abusers,310 which, while in-
cluded in the Protocol, 311 is not to be found in the Single Con-
vention. The including of narcotics offenses in extradition treaties
remains non-mandatory, and a party is free to refuse to extradite
an offender if it does not believe the offense is sufficiently
serious.3 1 2 Parties are to take "all practicable measures for the
prevention of abuse of psychotropic substances" and the rehabili-
tation of users and undertake to provide the necessary facilities
and personnel to achieve this end.3 1 3
302 Id., art. 16, para. 4.
303 Id., art. 19. Cf. SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 14. See also notes
222-224 and accompanying text supra.
304 Psychotropic Convention, supra note 283, art. 19, para. I(a).
305 Id., art. 19, paras. 1,2.
306 Id., art. 21.
307 Id., art. 22.
308 SINGLE CONVENTION, supra note 188, art. 35, 36, and 38. See notes 247-56 and
accompanying text supra.
309 Psychotropic Convention, supra note 283, art. 2 1(b).
310 Id., art. 22, para. I(b).
311 See note 280 and accompanying text supra.
312 Id., art. 22, para. 2(b).
313 Id., art. 20. This provision is carried over into the Protocol as well. See note 275 and
accompanying text supra.
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III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONVENTIONS
In assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Single Con-
vention, its Protocol, and the Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances, it is necessary to keep in mind the nature of a multilateral
agreement. Such an agreement attempts to achieve two essentially
contradictory goals: effectiveness in accomplishing specific objec-
tives and broad acceptability. If it is to be effective, it must
establish a regime sufficiently rigorous to be able to deal with the
situation for which it was intended. It must enable nations to take
concerted action. With respect to drugs, such an agreement must
provide for the effective control of production and distribution on
a global scale and for the focusing of pressure on governments
unwilling to fulfill their obligations under the terms of the agree-
ment.
[T]he application of the narcotics treaties is primarily a func-
tion of governments and the degree of success attaching to
their operation depends first and last on how effectively and
how conscientiously the provisions are applied by national
administrations. Yet however precisely individual countries
may comply with the obligations they have assumed in be-
coming Contracting Parties, the underlying purpose of the
treaties will obviously fall short of fulfillment unless national
control measures are everywhere brought to a high standard
of efficiency and are interwoven into an international control
system.3 1 4
The agreement must be acceptable to as many states as pos-
sible. If it is too restrictive or if it demands too much, then it will
fail to attract the general support necessary for successful imple-
mentation. Unlike bilateral and multilateral treaties, where the
contracting parties share a commonality of interests and may
therefore agree to place substantial restrictions on themselves
individually in order to further the collective end, an agreement
which purports to be global in scope must be attractive to coun-
tries of vastly different levels of development, philosophies, and
aspirations.
A treaty [is] an agreement among States and any conclusions
reached must always reflect the difficulties of arriving at an
agreed compromise among parties whose interest[s] and ap-
proach[esl are not always the same.
It would seem, therefore, that those who sought a water-
314 INCB REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
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tight scheme of control must realize that its very rigidity
would make it impossible for it to be applied universally
315
Progress at the international level in the control of drug abuse
and illicit traffic has been disappointingly slow, and cooperation
frequently not all that might be desired.316 The United States
must accept a certain measure of responsibility for this condition.
For even as the United States has established itself as the leading
advocate of international efforts against drug abuse and illicit
traffic, its own domestic efforts with respect to these matters have
hardly comprised an exemplary model for others to follow. When
the commander and one-fifth of the New York City narcotics
investigatory unit are indicted for narcotics violations, 317 it does
not provide a very good example. When a person reputed to be a
major figure in organized heroin smuggling is released on a $250
bond318 and when charges against the leader of a group arrested
for smuggling $10 million worth of cocaine are dropped at the
request of the district attorney and no member of the group is
sentenced to more than one year in prison,319 it is permissible to
question the dedication of the American judicial system to punish-
ing illicit drug trafficking by "imprisonment or other penalties of
deprivation of liberty." When an investigation into heroin smug-
gling is discontinued because it appears to be implicating an
associate of high government officials;3 20 when the leading Ameri-
315 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF A PROTOCOL ON PSY-
CHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES (Vienna, II Jan.-19 Feb. 1971) Official Records, Vol. 2; U.N.
Doc. E/Conf. 58/7/Add. 1, at i.
316 Another area in which the United States believes that international coopera-
tion is vital . . . is in the field of drug abuse. I would be less than candid,
however, if I did not admit to our disappointment in the response of many
United Nations member governments.
It has been said that drug abuse is a problem only of the developed
countries, who therefore are the only ones who need be concerned. I need
not tell you what a similar attitude of indifference would do to the work of
this organization if this argument were applied to the problems of poverty,
illiteracy, and disease.
See "Problems and Opportunities for the U.N. Economic and Social Council," statement
by John Scali in ECOSOC, 55th Session, on July 9, 1973, in 69 DEPT. OF STATE BULL.
260, 262 (Aug. 13, 1973).
317 N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1974, § IV, at 2, col 3. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1973, at
34, col. 1, discussing the disappearance of $70 million worth of confiscated narcotics from
the New York City Police Headquarters between 1969 and 1972.
318 N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1974, at 40, col. 3.
319 N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
320 N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1973, at 44, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1973, at 1, col. 7,
referring to Robert Vesco, an alleged financing of $300,000 worth of heroin imports, and
an investigation of this which was terminated under suspicious circumstances.
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can undercover agent in a joint French-American anti-corruption
investigation admits to having committed bribery, perjury, and to
having served as a liaison to organized crime,3 21 then the public
attitude of the United States toward eliminating administrative
corruption may be questioned. Similarly, when the United States,
as the largest producer and distributor of psychotropic substances
in the world, fails to ratify the Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances, it is perhaps understandable that other nations whose
economies rely heavily on the production and sale of other drugs
have not rushed to ratify the Protocol or to undertake the consid-
erable effort and sacrifice to bring drugs under control.
Limited cooperation and less than full implementation of mul-
tilateral agreements are not, however, particularly new phenom-
ena. If they are to be effective, such agreements must take these
factors into account. It is possible to make several observations
from this perspective about the value of the multilateral drug
abuse conventions.
For the foreseeable future, it must be left to the bilateral and
regional treaties to attain the sophistication and mutual restraint
necessary for effective, direct action against drug abuse and illicit
traffic. The multilateral conventions must aim for more modest
goals, remaining sufficiently flexible to encourage adoption by a
large majority of states and sufficiently rigid to bring about an
improvement in the situation.
In this context, the Single Convention has achieved a reason-
able measure of success. It has proven to be invaluable in at least
three respects. First, it has provided an effective mechanism for
the collection of information concerning virtually every aspect of
both licit and illicit drug traffic. Information on the quantities of
drugs produced; the sources of these drugs; the quantities of
drugs exported, and consumed; the laws and regulations adopted
by states in the field of drug abuse; and the patterns of illicit
traffic, including seizures, is now available on a world-wide scale.
The accessibility of such information is a basic prerequisite to any
realistic attempt at controlling the illicit traffic.
Secondly, the Single Convention has provided a method where-
by the weight of global public opinion may be brought to bear on
nations which are reluctant to take action against illicit drug
traffic. Although the effect of such opinion is not susceptible to
precise measurement, it is not to be discounted.3 22
321 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
322 Public opinion forced the British to acceed to the first opium treaty in 1912 at The
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Finally, the Convention has fostered an atmosphere of in-
ternational cooperation and reliance in the area of drug abuse,
together with the awareness that drug abuse is a problem that
cannot be solved unilaterally. This atmosphere, together with
heightened concern about drugs, has not only contributed to the
signing of a number of bilateral treaties, 323 but has also made
possible the drafting of the more sophisticated and stronger Proto-
col to the Single Convention.
That the Protocol could be adopted at all is a gratifying devel-
opment. That it could be adopted without a single dissenting vote
is among the more hopeful signs for the future of multilateral
treaties in the field of drug control.32 4 It is a demonstration that,
although more slowly than might be desired, progress is possible;
that with accumulated experience in the realities of international
cooperation, nations are increasingly willing to move toward a
uniform application of higher standards against drug abuse and
illicit traffic, and more are willing to bind themselves to meet
them. It is unfortunate that the Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances predated the Protocol to the Single Convention, for had it
been otherwise, possibly the Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances would be better equipped to meet expectations when it is
adopted. Yet it is not too much to presume that in time it, too, will
benefit by strengthening amendments.
Perhaps the value of the multilateral drug control conventions
is best appreciated by envisioning the situation had they never
been adopted:
Treaties of themselves [do] not resolve a problem. It was
only too apparent that the treaties on narcotic drugs, which
had been replaced, by and large, by the 1961 Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs, and which had been generally
accepted by a large number of states, had not per se solved
the problem of drug abuse and illicit trafficking, but the exper-
ience of international life had made it clear that without the
international cooperation they generated, the situation would
have been catastrophic. 32 5
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Hague, and later induced them to abandon the lucrative India-China opium trade, which
had been responsible for up to 25% of the Crown Colony's annual revenues. See GENESIS,
supra note 186.
323 INCB REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
324 See note 261 supra.
325 See United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Protocol on Psychotropic
Substances supra note 315, at 1.
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